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Preemption and Regulatory Failure 
David C. Vladeck· 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
When the Titanic sailed on its maiden and final voyage on April 10, 
1912, it carried 2,227 passengers and crew; 1,523 perished after it hit an 
iceberg and sank in the frigid waters of the North Atlantic shortly after 
• Associate Professor of Law and Director, Institute for Public Representation, Georgetown 
University Law Center, and Scholar, Center for Progressive Reform. In the interests of full 
disclosure, my views about preemption were formed before I joined the Georgetown faculty. Before 
then, I spent twenty-five years as a staff attorney and then as director of Public Citizen Litigation 
Group, a public interest law firm in Washington, D.C. During my tenure there, Public Citizen 
Litigation Group was actively engaged in preemption litigation, arguing in favor of preserving state 
law damage remedies. A number of the cases discussed in this article, including the Supreme 
Court's pivotal ruling in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996), and the Third Circuit's recent 
ruling in Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2004), were handled by my Litigation 
Group colleagues. I and many Litigation Group colleagues filed amicus briefs or otherwise 
participated in several of the major Supreme Court cases involving preemption issues, including 
those discussed below. I would like to thank Brian Wolfman, the Litigation Group's current 
director, Allison Zieve, a senior lawyer at the Litigation Group, and Professors Lisa Heinzerling, 
Thomas McGarity, Douglas Kysar, and John Mikhail for their thoughts on this article. 
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midnight on April 15, 1912.1 The Titanic carried sixteen lifeboats with a 
maximum capacity of 980 people, thus satisfying, and in fact exceeding, the 
then-current maritime safety regulations set by the British Board of Trade. 2 
The Board of Trade's standard had been set in 1884, when the largest vessel 
afloat was approximately one-quarter of the size of the Titanic and other 
new "super liners," such as the Lusitania and the Mauretania, which carried 
far more passengers than their predecessors. 3 The Board of Trade was not 
unmindful of this development. In fact, a Board advisory committee met in 
1911 to consider upgrading the Board's lifeboat requirements, but took no 
action. 4 A year later, over 1,500 died. 
Now fast-forward ninety-three years to March 2005. Joshua Oukrop, a 
twenty-one-year-old college student, is on a spring break trip to Moab, Utah, 
with his girlfriend. 5 They go for a bike ride, but Joshua soon complains of 
fatigue, falls to the ground, and dies of cardiac arrest. 6 Why? Because a 
defibrillator implanted in Joshua's chest - a Ventak Prizm 2 Model 1861 
manufactured by the Guidant Corporation - had a defect that caused it to 
short-circuit and malfunction. 7 Joshua was born with a relatively common 
genetic disease, hypertrophic cardiomyopathy, which causes erratic 
heartbeats and, if untreated, can trigger abrupt cardiac arrest. 8 But Joshua 
was able to lead a normal life because the defibrillator ensured that his heart 
beat regularly, that is, until it short-circuited and failed. 9 Nearly thirty 
thousand of these units were sold by Guidant, many after Guidant had 
learned of the design flaw and had developed a newer and safer 
defibrillator. to The Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") had approved 
this defibrillator for use in patients with hypertrophic cardiomyopathy, but 
was unaware of the defect at the time the device was approved or indeed, at 
the time of Joshua's death. II Ultimately, three years after learning of the 
defect, after dozens of other failures (including at least one other death and 
several heart attacks), and prodding from the FDA, Guidant reluctantly 
decided to "recall" the product. 12 
I. See JOHN P. EATON & CHARLES A. HAAS, TITANIC: DESTINATION DISASTER THE LEGENDS 
AND THE REALITY 148 (1987); JOHN DUDMAN, GREAT DISASTERS: THE SINKING OF THE TITANIC 
12-13,20 (1988). 
2. EATON & HAAS, supra note I,at 113. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. Barry Meier, Maker of Heart Device Kept Flaw From Doctors, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2005, 
at AI; see also Barry Meier, Repeated Defect in Heart Device Exposes a History of Problems, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 20, 2005, at A I. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
10. Barry Meier, Citing Flaws, Maker Recalls Heart Devices, N.Y. TIMES, June 18,2005, at AI. 
II. Id.. 
12. Id. "Recalling" a defibrillator implanted in the chest of a patient is different from recalling 
other consumer products, such as toys or cars. For many cardiac patients, the risks of additional 
surgery to explant a defective defibrillator, pacemaker, or heart valve outweigh the risks posed by 
even a defective product. See, e.g., Barry Meier, Maker of Heart Device Kept Flaw From Doctors, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2005, at AI. As a result, many patients rationally may decide not to undergo 
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Often a page of history speaks volumes. The tragic deaths of Joshua 
Oukrop and the over 1,500 who perished on the star-crossed Titanic offer a 
cautionary tale of the hazards of relying on regulatory standards alone to 
define an appropriate level of public safety. Indeed, there are sound reasons 
why regulatory and tort systems have historically operated in tandem to 
place separate, albeit reinforcing, disciplines on the market. When 
functioning well, a regulatory system prevents injury and rewards 
innovation. But too often there are regulatory gaps that jeopardize public 
safety. Since the founding of our Republic, tort liability has filled those gaps 
by providing compensation to those who are injured and by deterring 
unwarranted risk-taking. But the safety net of tort liability is under assault 
by aggressive, and often successful, assertions of federal preemption. That 
same battle is likely to be fought over the death of Joshua Oukrop, since it is 
a virtual certainty that Guidant will claim that any action brought against it 
by Joshua's family is preempted by federal law. 
This symposium was convened to address the growing and seemingly 
conflicting jurisprudence governing federal preemption of state damage 
actions. One way to evaluate the evolution of preemption law is to examine 
it through the lens of litigation under the preemption provision of the 1976 
Medical Device Amendments ("MDA") to the federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Ace 3 - a provision that in many respects is typical of express 
preemption provisions in regulatory statutes and has spawned a high volume 
of litigation. The question raised in cases under the MDA is whether the 
Act's preemption provision nullifies state damage actions based on personal 
injuries caused by medical devices that are defective, poorly designed, or 
promoted in ways that do not alert patients (and physicians) to the risks that 
attend their use. 14 The answer to that question depends on how one reads 
the MDA preemption provision. It provides, in pertinent part, that 
no State or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue 
in effect with respect to a device intended for human use any 
replacement surgery, but then endure the risk of life-threatening product failure. See, e.g., id. A 
young and otherwise healthy patient like Joshua Oukrop would have likely opted to have 
replacement surgery. This problem is a recurring one. See Letter from J. Kermit Smith, Chairman, 
Supervisory Panel of Trustees for the Bowling-Pfizer Heart Valve Settlement Funds (Jan. 1998), 
available at http://www.fda.gov/medwatch/SAFETYIl998lbjork.htm (reporting recommendations of 
an expert panel working under the FDA's auspices on the criteria that should be employed to 
determine whether patients with defective Bjork-Shiley heart valves should endure risk of surgery to 
obtain a replacement valve); see also Barry Meier, Faulty Heart Devices Force Some Scary 
Decisions, N.Y. TiMES, June 20, 2005, at AI; Ben Harder, Heart Device Recall: For Patients With 
Suspect Models, Tough Choices, WASH. POST, June 18,2005, at HI. 
13. 21 U.S.C. § 360k (1999). 
14. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 474 (1996) ("The question presented is 
whether [the MDA] pre-empts a state common-law negligence action against the manufacturer of an 
allegedly defective medical device."). 
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requirement - (1) which is different from, or in addition to, any 
requirement applicable under this chapter to the device, and (2) 
which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any 
other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device 
under this chapter. 15 
Note at the outset that nothing in this statute says, in so many words, 
that Congress is seeking to nullify existing state damage claims, which 
traditionally provide compensation to those injured through the fault of 
others. There are federal statutes that do, in fact, explicitly nullify state-law 
damage claims, but they do so in unmistakable terms, and generally provide 
a federal remedy in lieu of the displaced state remedies. 16 The MDA is not 
one of these rare statutes. It provides the FDA regulatory authority over 
medical devices, and seeks to displace inconsistent state regulation to avoid 
saddling medical device manufacturers with state-imposed regulatory 
burdens that conflict with or differ from those imposed by the FDA. 
Despite the MDA's focus on regulation and not liability, courts have 
entertained claims from medical device manufacturers that the MDA broadly 
preempts state damages claims. 17 As the courts see it, the crucial 
interpretative question is what does the word "requirement" mean? 18 The 
Act preempts only state law "requirement[s]" that are "different from, or in 
addition to, any requirement" imposed by the Act relating to the "safety or 
effectiveness of the device.,,19 The word "requirement" could plausibly be 
read to encompass only positive state law - that is, commands imposed by 
state statutes or duly promulgated state regulations that carry the force of 
law. Under that reading, the MDA preemption provision would bar only 
state law or regulations that imposed requirements different from or in 
addition to those imposed by federal law regarding the device in question. 
Or the word "requirement" could be read more broadly to include state tort 
and damages law, which, through serial jury verdicts, could also be said to 
impose "requirement[s]." Courts have struggled with this question and have 
reached differing conclusions. 
The Supreme Court had an opportunity to resolve the question in 
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,20 a personal injury action brought by a woman who 
IS. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a). 
16. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (2000) (provision of the Price-Anderson Act federalizing all 
claims for personal injury and property damage arising from significant accidents at nuclear power 
plants); 42 U.S.c. §§ 300aa-1 to 300aa-34 (2000) (National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 
federalizing all claims arising from personal injuries relating to the administration of vaccines); 49 
U.S.C. § 40101 (Supp. 2004) (Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act of 2001, also 
known as the September II th Victim Compensation Fund, which substitutes a federal remedy for the 
tort claims 9/11 victims and their families could have asserted against the airlines whose planes were 
hijacked); 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1999) (provision of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974 federalizing disputes over certain employment related benefits). 
17. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 488-89 (1996). 
18. /d. 
19. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a). 
20. 518 U.S. 470(1996). 
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sustained serious Injuries when her pacemaker failed. 21 Medtronic 
Corporation, the device's manufacturer, argued that the MDA entirely 
preempted her claims and left her without any remedy. 22 In rejecting 
Medtronic's preemption defenses, the Court noted that, although the FDA 
had generally approved the marketing of similar pacemakers, the FDA had 
not specifically approved the design of the Medtronic pacemaker. 23 Had the 
FDA done so, the Court observed, that might present a more difficult case. 24 
But the Court did not reach that question. Although agreeing with the 
majority's holdings, Justice Breyer filed a concurring opinion, concluding 
that the preemption provision's reference to "requirements" encompasses 
not just state positive law, but, relying on Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 
also state common law tort actions that, when enforced through jury awards, 
impose duties on device manufacturers. 25 Justice Breyer also disagreed with 
the observation in the plurality opinion, written by Justice Stevens, that 
preemption under the MDA would be "rare.,,26 
The contours of the Court's ruling in Medtronic are unclear and hotly 
disputed, and there has been a flood of conflicting lower court cases in 
Medtronic's aftermath attempting to draw a line between those claims 
preempted by the MDA and those claims that are not preempted. This 
article explores the repercussions of Medtronic, not just for medical device 
litigation, but more broadly for preemption cases where the defendant claims 
that federal law ousts state law damage actions. It makes four points: 
First, the Court took a wrong tum in Cipol/one, and it should not repeat 
that error elsewhere. 27 Congress' use of words like "requirements" in 
regulatory statutes should be seen as references to positive state law only, 
and should not be read, unless there is an explicit command by Congress to 
the contrary, to subsume state law damage actions. 28 In the context of 
regulatory statutes, words like "requirement" should be read in context to 
include only specific state statutory or regulatory commands. Indeed, it 
21. ld. at 480-81. 
22. ld. at 481. 
23. ld. at 493. 
24. ld. at 493-94. 
25. ld. at 504 (Breyer, 1., concurring) (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504,521 
(1992». 
26. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 508 (1996) (Breyer, 1., concurring). 
27. Cippollone, which is discussed in greater detail below, see infra notes 64-76 and 
accompanying text, held that certain state damage claims for injuries alleged to have been caused by 
cigarette smoking were preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act because 
common law duties constituted "requirements." Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504,521 
(1992). 
28. This is not a novel idea. See Betsy 1. Grey, Make Congress Speak Clearly: Federal 
Preemption of State Tort Remedies, 77 B.U. 1. REv. 559, 559-60 (1997) (taking the same position 
and observing that "there is no better illustration of the Court's schizophrenia than in the area of 
federal preemption of state tort remedies."). 
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appears that the Court is trying to put the Cipollone genie back in the bottle. 
In Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC,29 the Court noted that, although 
common law rules may qualify as "requirements," that does not necessarily 
mean that tort actions based on common law rules are preempted. 30 Courts 
must determine whether the common law duties imposed by state law are 
sufficiently direct and prescriptive to constitute "requirements." And courts 
must determine whether there was a history of product liability litigation 
over the regulated products prior to the enactment of federal law. 31 If there 
was, as there was in Bates, then the Court thought that if Congress intended 
to deprive injured parties of pre-existing compensatory remedies, it would 
do so with unmistakable clarity. 32 
Second, lower courts have too often failed to follow faithfully the 
Medtronic preemption rule. That failure, however, may be a byproduct of 
the confusion sown by the complexity of the opinion itself. Fairly read, the 
rule of preemption developed in Medtronic is a narrow one, requiring that 
for state law to be ousted there must be specific and conflicting requirements 
for a device imposed by both state and federal law. 33 General tort duties do 
not suffice, since they do not impose requirements specific to a given device. 
Regrettably, some lower courts have found preemption based solely on 
specific requirements imposed by federal law, even though the counterpart 
state requirements are general background tort and product liability 
principles that do not impose device-specific duties on manufacturers. At 
some point, the Supreme Court will have to clarify this issue, which 
continues to bedevil the lower courts. 
Third, courts should be wary of Executive Branch attempts to engage in 
"tort reform" efforts in private litigation. The current Bush Administration 
has taken unprecedented steps to persuade courts to adopt its pro-preemption 
posItIon. In so doing, the Administration has broken a longstanding 
Executive Branch tradition of ordinarily providing its views to courts only 
when asked and has accomplished an about-face concerning the preemptive 
reach of the MDA preemption provision. Worse, by working hand-in-glove 
with industry to change the law on preemption, the Administration has given 
the public legitimate reason to question whether the FDA is serving the 
interests of the public or the industry it regulates. The Supreme Court has 
rejected the Bush Administration's effort to re-write the government's 
position on preemption under a different statute;34 the courts should do the 
same under the MDA. 
29. 125 S. Ct. 1788 (2005). 
30. [d. at 1791; see, e.g., Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51 (2002) (holding that the 
Federal Boat Safety Act does not preempt common law tort claims arising out of a failure to install 
propeller guards on motorboats). 
31. See Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1801-02. 
32. [d. 
33. The Court in Bates adopted this reading of Medtronic. See id. at 1800-01. 
34. See id. at 1801 (noting agency's change of views and giving no weight to agency amicus 
brief). It bears noting that the Clinton Administration also submitted an amicus brief reversing the 
Federal Highway Administration's view of the preemptive scope of its statute governing railroad 
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Fourth, make no mistake about preemption defenses; they are efforts by 
industry to shed an important source of market discipline - the threat of 
liability for visiting unjustifiable harm on others - a discipline that 
regulation cannot itself provide, and preemption claims must be evaluated on 
those terms. It is no surprise that industry seeks to avoid liability. What is 
important here is that judges reviewing preemption claims take into account 
the overall regulatory and liability context in evaluating industry's claim that 
Congress intended to remove the discipline imposed by the tort system. 
Medical devices are a perfect illustration of the inadequacy of relying on 
regulation alone. The MDA was passed in 1976 in the wake of several 
notorious failures of medical devices, especially the Dalkon Shield. These 
failures had been brought to light through product liability litigation, and 
litigation provided the only compensation to the thousands who were 
injured. Since the MDA became law, the medical device industry has been 
extensively regulated by the FDA. The FDA is perhaps the most capable 
federal safety agency, but it cannot exert sufficient discipline on the 
marketplace to ensure an adequate margin of safety for the devices on the 
market, a fact that the agency, at least until recently, itself acknowledged. 35 
Although the FDA in the current Administration now argues for broad 
preemption of product liability for manufacturers, the FDA's ability to 
single-handedly regulate the market does not match its rhetoric. Daily front-
page stories about harmful medical devices on the market such as defective 
Guidant defibrillators, Medtronic and Baxter infusion pumps, and Johnson & 
crossing gates, and the Court similarly gave no weight to the agency amicus brief in that case. See 
Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344, 356 (2000). 
35. See Margaret Jane Porter, The Lohr Decision: FDA Perspective and Position, 52 Food & 
Drug L. 1. 7, II (1997). Ms. Porter, then FDA's Chief Counsel; observed: 
FDA product approval and state tort liability usually operate independently, each 
providing a significant, yet distinct, layer of consumer protection. FDA regulation of a 
device cannot anticipate and protect against all safety risks to individual consumers. Even 
the most thorough regulation of a product such as a critical medical device may fail to 
identify potential problems presented by the product. Regulation cannot protect against 
all possible injuries that might result from use of a device over time. Preemption of all 
such claims would result in the loss of a significant layer of consumer protection, leaving 
consumers without a remedy for injuries caused by defective medical devices. 
[d. The Institute of Medicine has recently voiced concerned over the shortcomings of FDA 
regulation of medical devices and has called on Congress to strengthen the FDA's authority in this 
area. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, SAFE MEDICAL DEVICES FOR CHILDREN (Marilyn J. Field & Hugh 
Tilson eds., Nat'! Academies Press, forthcoming 2006), available at 
http://www.nap.edulbooks/0309096316lhtml/ [hereinafter INST. OF MED.). The Institute had been 
asked by Congress in 2002 to study the FDA's regulation of medical devices intended for children, 
but the Institute's team found so little information on the subject that it decided to expand its review 
to all medical devices. The Institute's report notes "shortfalls in FDA performance" regulating 
medical devices that "are not specific to children." [d. at 5; see generally Marc Kaufman, Cardiac 
Devices May Need Replacing: Guidant Confirms Defects in up to 28,000 Pacemakers, WASH. POST, 
July 19, 2005, at D1; Barry Meier, Repeated Defect in Heart Device Exposes a History of Problems, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2005, at AI. 
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Johnson and Boston Scientific heart stents, raise serious questions about the 
ability of the FDA approval process to provide adequate assurance of safety 
by itself. 
A. Background 
Under federal law, the tenn "medical device" includes a vast array of 
products, such as tongue depressors, band-aids, bone screws, hip 
replacements, artificial heart valves, in vitro diagnostics and MRI machines 
that might be used to support or enhance human health. 36 The FDA 
estimates that there are over 80,000 medical devices on the market. 37 
Medical devices are categorized into three classes based on the potential risk 
of hann posed. 38 Class I devices, like tongue depressors, are subject to only 
"general controls" that provide a reasonable assurance of safety. 39 Class II 
devices, such as hearing aids, are subject to somewhat stricter FDA 
regulation. 40 Class III devices - like pacemakers and artificial heart valves -
are used to sustain human life or pose potentially unreasonable risks to 
patients. 41 Before marketing a Class III device a manufacturer must submit 
a pre-market approval (PMA) application to the FDA requesting pennission 
to market the device for uses identified in the application. 42 There are two 
exceptions to this requirement. First, any device marketed prior to the MDA 
- a "grandfathered" device - is not subject to the PMA requirement. 43 
Second, a device first marketed after 1976 may bypass the PMA requirement 
if the manufacturer can show that it is "substantially equivalent" to either a 
grandfathered device or a Class I or II device. 44 Before granting a PMA, the 
FDA must make a detennination that there is a "reasonable assurance" that 
the device is safe and effective for its intended use. 45 
Prior to the MDA, medical devices were largely unregulated by the 
FDA. 46 Although the FDA had and exercised the authority to seize 
adulterated and misbranded products once they were on the market, it lacked 
the authority to require medical devices to be screened by the agency before 
entering the market, even though it had possessed that authority with respect 
to drugs for decades. 47 
36. See 21 U .S.C. § 321 (h) (2000). 
37. INST. OF MED., supra note 35, at 63 ("According to FDA, approximately 20,000 American 
and foreign firms produce about 80,000 brands and models of medical devices for the U.S. market. 
Before they can be marketed in the United States, roughly 55 to 60 percent of medical devices 
require FDA clearance or approval.") (citation omitted). 
38. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 476 (1996). 
39. See id. at 476-77 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(I)(A) (2000». 
40. See id. at 477 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(I)(B». 
41. See id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360(a)(I)(C». 
42. See id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(2». 
43. See id. at 477-78 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360e(b)(I)(A». 
44. See id. at 478 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360e(b)(l)(B». 
45. See id. at 477 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(2». 
46. See id. at 475-76. 
47. See id. 
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By the mid-1970s, the perils of this regulatory gap had been driven 
home to Congress in a series of highly-publicized and widespread public 
health hazards caused by dangerous medical devices. 48 Perhaps the most 
notorious example is that of the defectively-designed Dalkon Shield 
intrauterine device, which had been introduced and widely marketed by the 
A.H. Robins Company without FDA approval.49 Before it was withdrawn 
from the market, the Dalkon Shield had caused numerous deaths and 
thousands of serious injuries to otherwise healthy women. 50 To fill this 
regulatory gap, Senator Ted Kennedy proposed the MDA, which he said was 
"written so that the benefit of the doubt is always given to the consumer. 
After all it is the consumer who pays with his health and his life for medical 
device malfunctions.,,51 Prior to the enactment of the MDA, individuals 
could and did seek redress for injuries caused by medical devices through 
state law damage actions. Indeed, it was the cumulative weight of such state 
law damage actions that forced the A.H. Robins Company into bankruptcy. 52 
There is not a hint in the legislative history of the MDA that Congress 
intended that the amendments would restrict the right of injured persons to 
bring state law damage actions for compensation. 53 To the contrary, the 
MDA was enacted to strengthen consumer protection in light of public 
health tragedies like that triggered by the Dalkon Shield. 54 Surely Congress' 
48. See id. 
49. See id. at 476. 
50. For riveting accounts of the legal implications of the Dalkon Shield debacle, see RICHARD 
B. SOBOL, BENDING THE LAW: THE STORY OF THE DALKON SHIELD BANKRUPTCY (U. Chi. Press 
1991) and MORTON MINTZ, AT ANY COST: CORPORATE GREED, WOMEN, AND THE DALKON SHIELD 
(Pantheon Press 1985). 
51. 121 CONGo REc. 10688 (daily ed. Apr. 17, 1975) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). 
52. SOBOL, supra note 50. The Dalkon Shield story also underscores the shortcomings of tort 
litigation. Women who sued Robins were subjected to hostile questions by Robins' counsel. See id. 
at 13. Robins 
would interrogate plaintiffs about their sexual and hygienic habits. Robins took the 
position that multiple sex partners, with the accompanying increased risk of contracting 
sexually transmitted diseases, were a more likely cause of uterine infections than was the 
Dalkon Shield. Attorneys for the company would ask the plaintiff to identifY her sex 
partners so that these men could be subpoenaed and asked about their medical histories. 
Women were also asked to describe their sexual practices .... 
/d. Sobol notes that although "[ t ]he courts divided on whether to require answers to these 
questions," the fact that they were raised "dissuaded many women from pressing forward with their 
claims (or from making claims at all) and induced others to accept cheap settlements offered by 
Robins." Id. Not only was the litigation process forbidding, it also fell short of its promise of full 
compensation to those injured. Once Robins filed for bankruptcy, most claimants were left with 
little or nothing. Id. at 313 (listing post-bankruptcy settlement values of claims, with proposed pay-
outs of $5,500 for women rendered sterile to $1,000 for women who had suffered spontaneous 
abortion). 
53. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 490-91 & nn.I2 & 13 (1996). 
54. See Mark E. Gelsing, Medtronic. Inc. v. Lohr: Is Federal Pre-emption a Heartbeat away 
from Death under the Medical Device Amendments?, 25 PEPP. L. REv. 647,653,653 n.53 (1998) 
(stating that with the MDA "Congress desired to protect consumers from 'increasingly complex 
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concern with the hann caused by defective medical devices did not impel it 
to cut-back or indeed erase the remedies available to people injured by such 
devices. 55 Congress was well aware of the role that state damage actions 
played in bringing the Dalkon Shield problem to light, in forcing a 
recalcitrant company to remove a dangerous product from the market, and in 
compensating the thousands of women severely injured by the device. 56 
Congress would surely not, in the same Act, have removed all means of 
judicial recourse for the victims of future tragedies caused by defective 
medical devices, without saying so in the most unequivocal of tenns. 57 And 
indeed, for the first decade or more the Act was on the books, preemption 
defenses were rarely asserted by manufacturers and even more rarely 
accepted by courts - reflecting the understanding that Congress did not 
intend the MDA preemption provision to be a defense to state law damage 
actions. 58 
So why, then, is there an express preemption provision in the MDA? 
The answer is straightforward. Prior to the enactment of the MDA, state 
legislatures had tried to fill the vacuum created by the absence of federal 
regulation. For example, in an effort to prevent recurrences of the Dalkon 
Shield tragedy, California had passed legislation requiring State pre-
marketing approval for intrauterine devices. 59 Other states regulated hearing 
aides. 60 Concluding that state pre-marketing scrutiny was better than none, 
Congress crafted a preemption provision that pennitted state regulatory 
programs to remain in place until the FDA implemented specific counterpart 
devices which pose[d] serious risk if inadequately tested or improperly designed or used' .... " 
(quoting S. REp. No. 94-33, at 5 (1975) (Conf. Rep.) (alteration in original». 
55. ld. 
56. ld. 
57. ld. 
58. See generally James P. Walsh, Nieho.IJv. Surgidev Corp: No Preemption of Kentucky Tort 
Law Claims by the Federal Medical Device Amendments, 25 N. Ky. L. REv. 615, 624 (1998) (noting 
that "[f]or many years, the Supreme Court was reluctant to find that federal public safety statutes 
preempted state law tort actions to recover damages," and citing Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 
484 U.S. 238 (1984». 
59. See generally Exemptions from Federal Preemption of State and Local Medical Device 
Requirements, 21 C.F .R. § 808 (2005) (laying out procedures by which states may obtain 
exemptions from preemption under the MDA and identifYing state laws not subject to preemption). 
See also Robert S. Adler & Richard A. Mann, Preemption and Medical Devices: The Courts Run 
Amok, 59 Mo. L. REv. 895, 924-25, 924 n.131 (1994) (quoting the House Report on the MDA as 
stating that, at the time the MDA was enacted, "[t]he most comprehensive State regulation ... is 
that of California .... [The Sherman Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Law, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY 
CODE §§ 26000-26851 (Deering 1988)] requires premarket approval of all new medical devices, 
requires compliance of device manufacturers with good manufacturing practices and authorizes 
inspection of establishments which manufacture devices.") (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 853, 94th Cong., 
2d Sess. 45 (1976». 
60. See, e.g., New Jersey Guild of Hearing Aid Dispensers v. Long, 384 A.2d 795, 806 (N.J. 
1978) (describing the objectives of the Hearing Aid Dispensers Act of New Jersey and its "pre-sale 
testing requirement"). 
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regulations. 61 Thereafter, of course, FDA regulations would preempt 
conflicting state or local regulatory measures. 62 
B. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr 
As noted, MDA preemption defenses to state-law damage actions were 
not frequently asserted until the early 1990s.63 That all changed with the 
Supreme Court's ruling in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. 64 In Cipollone, 
the son of a long-time smoker who had died from lung cancer sued several 
tobacco companies, claiming that they were responsible for his mother's 
death. 65 His complaint asserted a number of claims, including design defect, 
failure to warn, negligence, breach of express warranty, fraudulent 
misrepresentation, and conspiracy to defraud consumers by denying the 
public scientific information showing the perils of smoking. 66 The 
defendants argued that all of Cipollone's claims were preempted by the 
Public Health Cigarette Acts of 1965 and 1969,67 which spelled out 
warnings for cigarette labels, packaging and advertising and preempted 
additional regulation of cigarette advertising by state and local 
governments. 68 The Court first rejected the companies' claim that the 1965 
Act preempted Cipollone's claim. 69 That Act's preemption provision said 
that '''[n]o statement relating to smoking and health shall be required in the 
advertising of [properly labeled] cigarettes. ",70 This language, the Court 
held, "only pre-empted state and federal rulemaking bodies from mandating 
particular cautionary statements and did not pre-ernpt state-law damages 
actions.,,71 
But the Court reached a different conclusion with respect to the 1969 
Act. 72 The language in that statute was, in the Court's view, "much 
61. See Michael K. Carrier, Federal Preemption o/Common Law Tort Awards by the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 51 FOOD & DRUG LJ. 509, 552-53 (1996) (describing the 
construction and implication of the preemption provision). 
62. Congress also authorized the FDA to grant state and local governments exemptions from 
preemption; the FDA's regulations implementing that provision apply only to positive law - statutes, 
rules, regulations or ordinances. 21 C.F.R. § 808.20(c)(I). 
63. See Adler & Mann, supra note 59, at 897-98 (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 
504 (1992) and saying it prompted courts to "reject injured consumers' claims against device 
manufacturers on the basis that the claims are preempted" by the 1976 MDA to the Federal Food, 
Drug and Cosmetic Act). 
64. 505 U.S. 504 (1992). 
65. !d. at 508. 
66. Id. at 509-10. 
67. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (2000). 
68. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 510. 
69. Id. at 519-20. 
70. Id. at 518 (quoting § 5(b) of the 1965 Act). 
71. Id. at 519-20. 
72. Id. at 520. 
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broader" in two respects. 73 First, the "statement[ s]" language was replaced 
by the term "'requirement[s] or prohibition[s] ... imposed under State 
law,'" and second, the 1969 Act extended beyond "advertising to obligations 
'with respect to the advertising or promotion' of cigarettes.,,74 The Court 
then held that the "phrase '[n]o requirement or prohibition' sweeps broadly 
and suggests no distinction between positive enactments and common law; 
to the contrary, those words easily encompass obligations that take the form 
of common-law rules.,,75 In light of that conclusion, the Court held that 
some of the plaintiffs failure to warn claims - those that were based on 
representations that the companies made in conformity with the 1969 Act -
were preempted, but that other claims, going to the tobacco industries' fraud 
and misrepresentation, were not. 76 
Cipollone unleashed a torrent of preemption litigation, including the 
ongoing litigation over medical devices. 77 Prior to Cipollone, preemption 
defenses were a rarity; post-Cipollone, they were routine. As the petition for 
certiorari in Medtronic made clear, by the time the Eleventh Circuit issued 
its ruling in the case, most circuits, and many district courts, had weighed in 
on the question of the preemptive scope of the MDA, and thus the 
preemption question in Medtronic was ripe for decision. 78 
The facts of Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr79 are typical of these cases. Lora 
Lohr was in her late twenties when a heart defect necessitated the use of a 
pacemaker. 80 In 1987, Ms. Lohr received a Medtronic pacemaker that used 
a Medtronic Model 4011 lead, the wire carrying the electrical current from 
the pacemaker to Ms. Lohr's heart. 81 The FDA had never approved this 
73. Id. 
74. Id. (quoting § 5(b) ofthe 1969 Act). 
75. Id. at 521. This passage appears in Part V of the opinion, which was written by Justice 
Stevens and joined in by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and O'Connor. It nonetheless 
constitutes the holding of the Court on this question. Justice Scalia, in a separate opinion in which 
Justice Thomas joined, largely agreed with Justice Stevens' statutory analysis and said that 
"the language of the [1969] Act plainly reaches beyond [positive] enactments;" that the 
general tort-law duties petitioner invokes against the cigarette companies can, as a 
general matter, impose "requirement[s] or prohibition[s]" within the meaning of § 5(b) of 
the 1969 Act; and that the phrase "State law" as used in that provision embraces state 
common law. 
Id. at 548-49 (citations omitted). Justice B1ackmun, joined by Justices Kennedy and Souter, 
dissented on this aspect of the Court's ruling. Id. at 534-44 (concluding that general tort law duties 
do not impose "requirements" within the meaning of the 1969 Act). 
76. Id. at 524-31 (plurality opinion). 
77. Cf Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 125 S. Ct. 1788, 1796-97 (2005) (pointing out that in 
the aftermath of Cipollone there was a "groundswell of federal and state decisions" holding that tort 
claims against pesticide manufacturers were preempted under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and 
Rodenticide Act). 
78. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, No. 95-754, at *11-*14 (filed 
on Nov. 13, 1995), available at 1995 WL 17013697, citing, inter alia, English v. Mentor Corp., 67 
F.3d 477 (3d Cir. 1995); Duvall v. Bristol-Myers-Squibb Co., 65 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 1995); Feldt v. 
Mentor Corp., 61 F.3d 431 (5th Cir. 1995); King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130 (1st Cir.), cert. 
denied. 5\0 U.S. 824 (1993); Slater v. Optical Radiation Corp., 961 F.2d 1330 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied. 506 U.S. 917 (1992). 
79. 518 U.S. 470 (1996). 
80. Id. at 480. 
81. Id. 
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lead. 82 Although the FDA had classified pacemaker leads as Class III 
devices, it had never issued a regulation calling for PMA applications for 
such devices. 83 The Medtronic lead had been found "substantially 
equivalent" to a pre-MDA device and was pennitted on the market for that 
reason. 84 Four years after the pacemaker was implanted, Ms. Lohr's device 
failed, resulting in a "complete heart block," which required Ms. Lohr to 
undergo emergency surgery to replace the pacemaker. 85 Her treating 
physician traced the pacemaker's failure to a defect in the lead. 86 
Ms. Lohr and her husband brought a state law damage action in state 
court raising claims based on defective design, defective manufacture, and 
failure to warn. 87 After Medtronic removed the case to federal court, it 
moved to dismiss the case in its entirety, arguing that the MDA's preemption 
provision gives device manufacturers a blanket immunity from tort 
liability.88 The district court granted summary judgment to Medtronic. 89 
The Eleventh Circuit reversed in part, finding that some of the Lohrs' claims 
were preempted, but that others were not. 90 The Supreme Court granted 
review and issued what remains the controlling decision on the scope of 
MDA preemption.91 Unfortunately, the Court's opinion is fractured and 
stating the Court's holding therefore requires careful attention to the votes 
cast by each Justice on each issue. Part III of the majority opinion sets forth 
three holdings that commanded the votes of all Justices. First, the MDA 
does not broadly preempt all state-law damage actions against medical 
device manufacturers. 92 Second, the Lohrs' design-defect claim was not 
preempted because the FDA had not issued any design-specific requirements 
for the device. 93 Third, a damage claim premised on state-law duties "equal 
to, or substantially identical to" requirements under the MDA or FDA 
implementing regulations is not preempted. 94 
In addition, the Court held in Part V of the majority opinion, by a 5-4 
margin, that the Lohrs' manufacturing defect and failure to warn claims 
were not preempted - even if they were based on state law duties that went 
82. !d. at 493. 
83. [d. at 493-94. 
84. [d. at 493. 
85. [d. at 480-8 I. 
86. [d. at 48 I. 
87. [d. 
88. [d. 
89. [d. at 483. 
90. [d. at 483-84. 
9 I. [d. at 484. 
92. [d. at 494, 497,502 (majority); id. at 513 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
93. [d. at 493-94 (majority); id. at 513 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
94. Id. at 497 (majority); id. at 5 I 3 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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beyond duties imposed by federal requirements for manufacturing and 
labeling.95 The Court looked to the language of the MDA preemption 
provision and noted the "overarching concern that pre-emption occur only 
where a particular state requirement threatens to interfere with a specific 
federal interest.,,96 The Court also was guided by the overriding purpose of 
the MDA, which was to provide for the safety and effectiveness of medical 
devices intended for human use. 97 In Medtronic, the generality of the 
FDA's regulations applicable to pacemakers "reflect important but entirely 
generic concerns about device regulation generally, not the sort of concerns 
regarding a specific device or field of device regulation that the statute or 
regulations were designed to protect from potentially contradictory state 
requirements.,,98 The Court also found the Lohrs' common-law claims not 
preempted because they were based on general state-law duties that do not 
specifically address medical devices. 99 General duties to use care in 
manufacturing and to warn users of possible risks are not the type of 
requirements that Congress or the FDA feared would impede the FDA's 
ability to enforce specific federal law. 100 
Speaking for a four-Justice plurality, the lead opinion also relied on the 
MDA's language and history to conclude in Part IV that the MDA 
preemption provision was not intended to preempt most, and perhaps all, 
damage actions. 101 The plurality did not decide definitively the scope of 
MDA preemption because under the majority's analysis, none of the Lohrs' 
claims were preempted. 102 
Justice Breyer filed a pivotal concurring opinion addressing his concerns 
with Parts VI and VI of the plurality opinion. 103 In his view, the preemption 
provision's reference to "requirements" encompasses not just state positive 
law, but, relying on Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,I04 also state law 
damage actions.105 He therefore did not join Part VI of the plurality opinion 
because he was not convinced that MDA preemption of common law claims 
would be "rare.,,106 He joined fully in the holdings set forth above, including 
Part V of the majority opinion, which demands specificity on both the 
federal and state side of the preemption analysis. 107 In Justice Breyer's 
view, the text of the MDA preemption provision reflected basic principles of 
conflict preemption, which ordinarily require a high degree of specificity, 
95. [d. at SOl. 
96. [d. at 500. 
97. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
98. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at SOl. 
99. [d. 
100. [d. at 502. 
101. [d. at 488-91. 
102. [d. at 502. 
103. [d. at 503 (Breyer, 1., concurring). 
\04. 505 U.S. 504, 519 (\992). 
lOS. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 508. 
106. [d. 
107. [d. at 500. 
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and he found no conflict between any federal requirement and any of the 
Lohrs' claims. 108 
Justice O'Connor filed an opinion dissenting in part and concurring in 
part, which was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and 
Thomas. 109 As did Justice Breyer, Justice O'Connor took the view that 
common law claims can constitute "requirements" under the preemption 
provision. 110 Although she agreed that the Lohrs' design-defect claim was 
not preempted, she would have held that the manufacturing defect and 
failure to warn claims were preempted to the extent that they sought to 
impose requirements different from those imposed by the FDA's 
manufacturing and labeling rules. III She agreed with the majority, however, 
that the Lohrs' state law manufacturing defect and failure to warn claims 
were not preempted to the extent that they were based on alleged violations 
offederallaw. 112 
Post-Medtronic, courts remain divided on the question that the Court did 
not reach; namely, whether the MDA preempts tort cases for PMA devices 
where the FDA in fact approved the specific device at issue. Some courts, 
like the Tenth Circuit in Gja v. Howmedica, Inc. 113 and Eleventh Circuit in 
Goodlin v. Medtronic, Inc.,114 apply the analysis laid out in Medtronic. They 
require that a manufacturer show specific and conflicting federal and state 
law requirements applicable to the particular device in order to establish 
preemption. 115 Other courts follow the approach typified by the Third 
Circuit's recent ruling in Horn v. Thoratec Corporation,1\6 which held that 
FDA approval of a PMA constitutes sufficient FDA oversight to trigger the 
preemption provision of the MDA. 117 According to the Horn court, "any 
finding" based on "general claims of negligence or defective design and 
108. [d. at 508. 
109. /d. at 509-14 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). 
11 O. [d. at 513. 
111. [d. at 513-14. 
112. /d. at 514. The Supreme Court has addressed the preemptive reach of the MDA only once 
since Medtronic. In Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Committee, 531 U.S. 341 (2001), plaintiffs 
injured by surgical screws (Class III devices) brought actions against a consulting firm that had 
assisted the manufacturer in obtaining FDA approval on a number of theories, including the theory 
that the consultant had made fraudulent representations to the FDA. [d. at 343. The Supreme Court 
held that the plaintiffs' fraud-on-the-FDA claims were preempted, not by virtue of the MDNs 
express preemption provision, but under an implied conflict preemption theory that rested on the 
observation that "the federal statutory scheme amply empowers the FDA to punish and deter fraud 
against the Administration," and that the balance achieved by the MDA "can be skewed by allowing 
fraud-on-the-FDA claims under state tort law." [d. at 348. 
113. 111 F.3d 782, 789 (lOth Cir. 1997). 
114. 167 F.3d 1367 (11th Cir. 1999). 
115. See, e.g., State ex rei. Miller v. New Womyn, Inc., 679 N.W.2d 593, 596 (Iowa 2004); 
Niehoffv. Surgidev Corp., 950 S.W.2d 816, 822 (Ky. 1997). 
116. 376 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2004). 
117. [d. at 173. 
109 
HeinOnline -- 33 Pepp. L. Rev. 110 2005-2006
manufacture - be it by a jury or a court - would necessarily amount to a 
state substantive requirement 'different from, or in addition to, the federal 
requirements imposed by the FDA. '" 118 At some point, the Supreme Court 
will have to step in to resolve this ongoing conflict. The following 
observations should guide the Court's analysis. 
II. ABSENT A CLEAR CONGRESSIONAL COMMAND, WORDS LIKE 
"REQUIREMENTS" IN REGULATORY STATUTES SHOULD NOT PREEMPT 
STATE DAMAGE CLAIMS 
The first and most important step the Supreme Court should take to 
restore coherence to its preemption jurisprudence is to acknowledge the 
error it made in Cipollone. 119 The Court should confine Cipollone to its 
facts and declare that Congress' use of words like "requirement" in 
regulatory statutes is a reference to positive state law only, and should not be 
read, unless there is clear-cut evidence to the contrary, to subsume state law 
damage actions. 120 
The Court took a wrong tum in Cipollone in holding that the reference 
to "requirement[ s] or prohibition[ s]" in the preemption provision of the 
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA) reaches common 
law tort actions. There is not a hint in either the language of the FCLAA or 
its legislative history that Congress understood that the preemption provision 
would nullify any state common law claims - even failure to warn claims 
that might arguably be in tension with the Act's dictates. To the contrary, 
the provision was included in the Act to "avoid the chaos created by a 
multiplicity of conflicting [state and local] regulations," not to deprive 
injured smokers of their state damages action remedies. 121 
118. [d. at 179. See also Martin v. Medtronic, Inc., 254 F.3d 573, 585 (5th Cir. 2001); Mitchell v. 
Collagen Corp., 126 F.3d 902, 911 (7th Cir. 1997). 
119. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992). 
120. By "regulatory statutes" I mean enactments that allocate regulatory responsibility between 
federal and state governments and assign regulatory responsibilities to federal agencies. Such 
enactments include, for example, the Medical Device Amendments, 21 U.S.c. § 360k (2000), which 
assign regulatory responsibility over medical devices to the FDA; the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide 
and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 136 (2000), which assigns regulatory authority over 
certain agricultural chemicals to the EPA; or the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 
1996, 49 U.S.C. §§ 30101-30169 (2000), which assigns responsibility for regulating the safety 
features of motor vehicles to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. I use this term to 
distinguish regulatory statutes from statutes that are specifically designed to supplant state liability 
regimes with federal ones, like the Price-Anderson Act, discussed supra note 16 and accompanying 
text. 
121. S. REp. No. 91-566 (1969) reprinted in 1970 U.S.S.C.A.N. 2652, 2663; see also H. R. REp. 
No. 91-289, at 9 (1969) (stating that the legislation "will prevent a chaotic situation from developing 
as different Federal, State, and local agencies strive to exercise overlapping and conflicting 
jurisdiction in this regard"). The language of the Act supports this reading. The Act states that its 
purpose is to ensure that "commerce and the national economy ... not [bel impeded by diverse, 
nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and advertising regulations with respect to any 
relationship between smoking and health." 15 U.S.C. § 1331(2) (2000). Justice Blackmun argued in 
his Cipollone dissent that "there is absolutely no suggestion in the legislative history that Congress 
intended to leave plaintiffs who were injured as a result of cigarette manufacturers' unlawful conduct 
without any alternative remedies; yet that is the regrettable effect of the ruling today that many state 
common-law damages claims are pre-ernpted." Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 531, 
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Nor, as a textual matter, is it at all clear that general common law duties 
constitute "requirements." Had Congress intended to broadly displace state 
damage actions, the choice of the word "requirements" is "singularly odd," 
particularly since far more precise words, like "remedies," are available. 122 
Words like "requirement" reflect an understanding that the state is imposing 
specific rather than general duties on the manufacturer. This was one point 
stressed by Justice Blackmun in his dissent in Cipollone,123 which Justices 
Souter and Kennedy joined. Justice Blackmun argued that, "[i]n light of the 
recognized distinction in this Court's jurisprudence between direct state 
regulation and the indirect regulatory effects of common-law damages 
actions, it cannot be said that damages claims are clearly or unambiguously 
'requirements' or 'prohibitions' imposed under state law.,,124 Tort liability 
necessarily exerts only an "indirect" effect on a manufacturer's behavior 
because, 
[a]lthough an award of damages by its very nature attaches 
additional consequences to the manufacturer's continued unlawful 
conduct, no particular course of action (e.g., the adoption of a new 
warning label) is required. A manufacturer found liable on, for 
example, a failure-to-warn claim may respond in a number of 
ways. 125 
It could adopt a new warning label, "dispens[ e] warnings through a variety 
of alternative mechanisms, such as package inserts, public service 
advertisements, or general educational programs," or even decide to make 
no changes and "accept damages awards as a cost of doing business.,,126 
"The level of choice that a defendant retains in shaping its own behavior 
541 (1992) (Blackrnun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The 1965 Act was far more 
limited than its successor; it required warning labels on cigarette packaging, but prohibited further 
regulation of cigarette advertising by any governmental body. Federal Cigarette Labeling and 
Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (\ 965). The 1969 Act banned cigarette 
advertisements on television and radio, gave the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") the authority to 
impose warning-label requirements on print advertisements, and stiffened the warnings on 
packaging. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (1970). 
In light of the broad regulatory authority conferred on the FTC over cigarette advertising and 
promotion by the 1969 Act, a preemption provision barring state and local regulation of cigarette 
advertising and promotion made sense. See generally Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 
543-46 (2001) (explaining that under the 1969 Act, the "FTC sought a complete ban on radio and 
television advertising, a requirement that broadcasters devote time for health hazard announcements 
concerning smoking, and increased funding for public education and research about smoking."). 
The Lorillard Court found a Massachusetts regulation that broadly restricted the outdoor advertising 
of cigarettes preempted by the FCLAA. Id. at 544, 546-51. 
122. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 487 (\996) (plurality opinion). 
123. 505 U.S. at 531,535 (Blackrnun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
124. Id. at 538. 
125. /d. at 536. 
126. Id. 
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distinguishes the indirect regulatory effect of the common law from positive 
enactments such as statutes and administrative regulations." 127 
To be sure, given the purpose of the FCLAA - to comprehensively 
regulate the warnings appearing on cigarette packaging and advertising 128 -
one can see why the Court might have perceived a tension between the Act's 
requirements and a common law claim for failure to warn. But nothing in 
the FCLAA prevented the companies from providing additional warnings. 129 
Tobacco companies could have made general public service announcements, 
underwritten educational programs, or engaged in other forms of advertising 
to warn consumers about the risks of smoking, all without running afoul of 
the Act. Thus, there would have been no conflict between the federal goals 
articulated in the FCLAA and jury verdicts finding that the companies had 
failed to meet their state law duties to warn consumers about the hazards of 
tobacco use. In the absence of a clear direction by Congress to abrogate 
state law damages claims, the Court in Cipollone was wrong to hold that 
FCLAA preempted any state-imposed duties other than conflicting positive 
state law. 130 Indeed, until Cipollone, it does not appear that the Court had 
ever invoked preemption to nullify a state damage action where the effect of 
doing so was to leave injured parties without any remedy. 131 
The Medtronic Court compounded the error in Cipollone by importing 
uncritically the rule of Cipollone into the MDA. 132 The error in Medtronic is 
hard to fathom. At the outset of the Court's opinion, it acknowledges that 
Medtronic's sweeping preemption argument was "not only unpersuasive, it 
is implausible," precisely because it would "have the perverse effect of 
granting complete immunity from design defect liability to an entire industry 
that, in the judgment of Congress, needed more stringent regulation in order 
'to provide for the safety and effectiveness of medical devices intended for 
human use.",133 The Court found it '''difficult to believe that Congress 
would, without comment, remove all means of judicial recourse for those 
127. Id. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
130. Other factors may have played a role in the Court's disposition in Cipollone. For one thing, 
because the Court's ruling only found failure to warn claims preempted from 1969 forward, its 
ruling did not nullify Cipollone'S claims based on pre-1969 conduct by the industry. See id. at 524. 
Moreover, the Court in Cipollone preserved claims based on "express warranty, intentional fraud 
and misrepresentation, or conspiracy," leaving the heart of the case intact. [d. at 530-31. Thus, in 
contrast with many preemption cases where a preemption finding leaves the victim without any 
remedy, the impact of the Court's ruling in Cipollone was more modest. The plurality opinion in 
Medtronic makes this point as well. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 487-89 (1996). 
131. The only case cited in Justice Stevens' plurality opinion for the proposition that state 
regulation can be as effectively asserted through damages actions as positive law is San Diego Bldg. 
Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959). Garmon held that the National Labor 
Relations Act (UNLRA") preempted state law regulating labor-management relations. Id. But 
critical to the Garmon Court's reasoning was the Court's observation that the NLRA was Ua 
complex and interrelated federal scheme of law, remedy, and administration." Id. at 243. Parties 
injured by labor strife have recourse to the National Labor Relations Board, which has substantial 
remedial authority. See id. at 245-46. 
132. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 484-85. 
133. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 487 (plurality opinion) (quoting 90 Stat. 539 (preamble to the 
MDA)). 
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injured by illegal conduct,'" and said that it would "take language much 
plainer" than that in the MDA preemption provision "to convince us that 
Congress intended that result.,,134 Nonetheless, the Medtronic Court left 
open the possibility that the MDA could '''remove all means of judicial 
recourse for those injured by illegal conduct'" where PMA devices are 
approved by the FDA. 135 
It appears, however, that the'Court is moving away from Cipollone. The 
path to put the Cipollone genie back in the bottle was marked, perhaps 
ironically, in Medtronic. There, Justice Stevens, the author of the plurality 
opinions in both Cipollone and Medtronic, was quite careful to confine 
Cipollone to its facts and to give the narrowest possible reading to its 
holding. 136 
The Court's next opportunity to address whether common law duties 
qualify as regulatory requirements came in Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine. 137 
In Sprietsma, Justice Stevens, this time writing for a unanimous Court, 
addressed broad preemption claims made by a boat manufacturer, who 
contended that the Federal Boat Safety Act ("FBSA,,)138 nullified all state 
law design defect damage actions. 139 The action was brought by the family 
of a woman killed when she fell overboard from the family's motorboat and 
was struck by the boat's propellers, which were not shielded by propeller 
guards. 140 The FBSA gives the Coast Guard broad authority to prescribe 
safety and performance standards for boats to be used for recreational 
purposes. 141 The Coast Guard had imposed a wide-range of requirements, 
but had not required motor-boat manufacturers to install propeller guards, 
although it was considering doing so. 142 The boat manufacturer argued, 
among other things, that the family's claims were preempted in their entirety 
134. Id. (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984)). 
135. Id. 
136. Id. at 487-89 (distinguishing Cipollone on a number of grounds). 
137. 537 U.S. 51 (2002). There was one intervening preemption decision that addressed the same 
essential question, but it was resolved on implied, not express, preemption grounds. Geier v. 
American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000). In Geier, the Court found a tort claim based on 
the lack of an air-bag in an automobile involved in a crash preempted. Id. at 866-68. The Court 
rejected Honda's argument that the express preemption provision in the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Act preempted the claim, since the provision applies only to a "safety standard applicable to 
the same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item of equipment which is not identical to the 
Federal standard." Id. at 866-68 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § I 392(d) (1988) (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 
30 I 03(b) (2000)). Nonetheless, the Court ruled 5-4 that the claim was impliedly preempted because 
permitting a tort claim to go forward would conflict with the Department of Transportation's 
decision to provide for a phase-in of air-bags. Id. at 876-81. 
138. 46 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4311 (2000). 
139. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 55-56 (2002). 
140. Id. at 54-55. 
141. Id. at 57 & n.6 (citing 46 U.S.C. § 4302). 
142. Id. at 59-62. 
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by the FBSA's preemption provision, which is similar to that in the MDA. 143 
It provides that "a State or political subdivision of a State may not establish, 
continue in effect, or enforce a law or regulation establishing a recreational 
vessel or associated equipment performance or other safety standard or 
imposing a requirement for associated equipment ... that is not identical to a 
regulation prescribed under" the Act. 144 
Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens quickly disposed of the boat 
manufacturer's express preemption defense. 145 Observing that the FBSA's 
preemption provision applies to state or local "law or regulation," he 
concluded that the language of the provision "is most naturally read as not 
encompassing common-law claims" because the terms used together 
"indicate that Congress pre-empted only positive enactments.,,146 He also 
emphasized that this reading of the FBSA "does not produce anomalous 
results. It would have been perfectly rational for Congress not to pre-empt 
common-law claims, which - unlike most administrative and legislative 
regulations - necessarily perform an important remedial role in 
compensating accident victims." 147 
The Court took its most significant step away from Cipollone in its 
recent ruling in Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC. 148 Bates was an action 
brought by Texas peanut farmers against Dow, which sold a weedkiller 
called "Strongarm," which the farmers alleged severely damaged their 
peanut crops in 2000. 149 Dow had registered Strongarm with the 
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") in 2000 with a label that stated, 
"Use of Strongarm is recommended in all areas where peanuts are 
grown.,,150 The farmers alleged that Dow knew or should have known at the 
time that Strongarm stunted the growth of peanuts in soil with a pH of 7.0 or 
greater. l5l When Dow registered Strongarm for 2001, it sought EPA 
approval for a supplemental label to be used in states where farmers 
experienced crop damage which set forth the following warning: "Do not 
apply Strongarm to soils with a pH of 7.2 or greater." 152 
Under the Federal Fungicide, Insecticide and Rodenticide Act 
("FIFRA"),153 the EPA has comprehensive regulatory authority over 
pesticides, and pesticides. may not be lawfully sold in the United States 
143. Id. at 56. 
144. 46 U.S.c. § 4306. 
145. Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 62-63. 
146. Id. at 63. 
147. Id. at 63-64 (citation omitted). Tellingly, the Court does not mention Cipollone in addressing 
the manufacturer's express preemption claim and Cipollone is nowhere discussed in the opinion. It 
is cited only once as part of the Court's discussion of the manufacturer's implied preemption claims, 
which the Court also rejected. ld. at 69. 
148. 125 S. Ct. 1788 (2005). 
149. ld. at 1792-93. 
150. Id. at 1793. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. 
153. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (2000). 
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unless they have been registered with the EPA. 154 The EPA will register a 
pesticide if it determines that it will not cause "unreasonable adverse effects 
on humans and the environment, and that its label complies with [FIFRA's] 
prohibition on misbranding.,,155 A pesticide is misbranded if its label 
contains a statement that is "false or misleading in any particular," or if it 
fails to contain adequate instructions for its use. 156 FIFRA also contains a 
preemption provision, 7 U.S.c. § 136v(b), which provides that "[a] State 
shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or 
packing in addition to or different from those required under this 
subchapter." 157 Dow argued, and the lower courts agreed, that the farmers' 
strict liability, negligence, fraud, and breach of warranty claims were 
preempted in their entirety. 158 
In rejecting Dow's preemption defense, the Court began by noting that 
FIFRA's preemption provision applies only to "requirements" and that under 
Cipollone, the term "reaches beyond positive enactments, such as statutes 
and regulations, to embrace common-law duties.,,159 Despite this nod to 
Cipollone, the Court then distanced itself from, if not repudiated, this core 
aspect of Cipollone. The lower court in Bates had concluded that the 
farmers' claims were preempted because a finding of liability "would induce 
Dow to alter [its] label."l60 The Court rejected this reasoning because an 
"effects-based test" finds no support in FIFRA's preemption provision, 
"which speaks only of 'requirements. ",161 In language that echoes Justice 
Blackmun's dissent in Cipollone and cannot be squared with Cipollone's 
holding, the Bates Court then explained that "[a] requirement is a rule of law 
that must be obeyed; an event, such as a jury verdict, that merely motivates 
an optional decision is not a requirement.,,162 
[54. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, [25 S. Ct. 1788, 1795 (2005). 
155. Id. at 1795 (citations omitted). Prior to 1978, the EPA also determined whether the pesticide 
was efficacious for its intended use. Id. at 1796. Congress amended the Act to authorize the EPA to 
waive data requirements pertaining to efficacy, thus permitting the EPA to register pesticides 
without confirming the efficacy claims made on the pesticide's label. Id. (citing 7 U.S.C. § 
136a(c)(5». In 1979, the EPA invoked this authority to issue a general waiver of efficacy review, 
with only limited qualifications not applicable in Bates. Id. (citing 44 Fed. Reg. 27932 (1979); 40 
C.F.R. § I 58.640(b». 
156. Id. at 1795. 
157. 7 U.S.C. § I 36(v)(b). The Court had previously ruled that the Act's reference to a "State" 
did not foreclose local regulation of pesticide use. See Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 50 I U.S. 597 
(1991). 
158. Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1793-94. 
159. Id. at 1798. 
160. Id. at 1799. 
161. Id. 
162. /d.; see also id. at 1798 ("An occurrence that merely motivates an optional decision does not 
qualify as a requirement."). 
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To drive this point home, the Bates Court added that the fact that FIFRA 
"might pre-empt judge-made rules" says "nothing about the scope of that 
pre-emption." 163 Under FIFRA, for a state rule to be preempted, two 
conditions must be met. First, the state rule "must be a requirement 'for 
labeling or packaging'; rules governing the design of a product, for example, 
are not pre-empted."I64 And second, the state rule "must impose a labeling 
or packaging requirement that is 'in addition to or different from those 
required under this subchapter. '" 165 
The Court then held that the farmers' "claims for defective design, 
defective manufacture, negligent testing, and breach of express warranty 
[were] not preempted.,,166 "Rules that require manufacturers to design 
reasonably safe products, to use due care in conducting appropriate testing 
of their products, to market products free of manufacturing defects, and to 
honor their express warranties or other contractual commitments plainly do 
not qualify as requirements" because "[n]one of these common-law rules 
requires that manufacturers label or package their products in any particular 
way." 167 With respect to Dow's express warranty, the Court added that 
although the warranty was on Strongarm's label, the "common-law rule does 
not require the manufacturer to make an express warranty, or in the event 
that the manufacturer elects to do so, to say anything in particular in that 
warranty." 168 
With respect to the farmers' fraud and failure to warn claims, the Court 
did find that adverse jury determinations on such claims could qualify as 
"requirements" if they actually imposed a substantive standard for a 
product's labeling.169 But even here, the Court immediately made clear that 
the Cipollone analysis would not govern because of the "rather obvious 
textual differences" between the two preemption provisions. 17o FIFRA, the 
Court noted, prohibits only state law restrictions that are "in addition to or 
different from" those imposed by FIFRA, and for that reason, a state law 
requirement is not preempted if it is equivalent to, and fully consistent with, 
FIFRA's requirements. 171 Federal and state laws that impose parallel 
requirements do not give rise to preemption. This analysis, the Court said, 
"finds strong support in Medtronic," which addressed "a similarly worded 
preemption provision.,,172 Invoking Justice O'Connor's separate opinion in 
Medtronic, the Court noted that "a state cause of action that seeks to enforce 
a federal requirement 'does not impose a requirement that is "different from, 
163. Id. at 1798 (emphasis in original). 
164. Id. 
165. Id. (emphasis in original). 
166. Id. 
167. Id. 
168. Id. at 1798-99. 
169. Id. at 1800. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. 
172. Id. 
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or in addition to," requirements under federal law. ",173 Moreover, the Court 
noted, FIFRA "does not preclude States from imposing different or 
additional remedies, but only different or additional requirements," and thus 
the fact that a damage remedy might give companies an additional reason to 
comply with the law is no defense to the application of consistent state 
law. 174 
So far, Bates simply builds on pre-existing preemption law. But Bates' 
significance becomes apparent in its concluding paragraphs, which defend 
its non-preemption ruling on two grounds never before given prominence in 
the Court's preemption decisions. First, the Court found that the "long 
history of tort litigation against manufacturers of poisonous substances" 
buttressed its conclusion that the farmers' claims were not preempted. 175 
The Court cited many reasons why this history was so significant. For one 
thing, the Court reasoned that had Congress intended "to deprive injured 
parties of a long available form of compensation, it surely would have 
expressed that intent more c1earIy.,,176 For another, the history of tort 
litigation "emphasizes the importance of providing an incentive to 
manufacturers to use the utmost care in the business of distributing 
inherently dangerous items.,,177 And the Court found it implausible that 
Congress considered a "relatively obscure" provision of FIFRA to "give 
pesticide manufacturers virtual immunity from certain forms of tort 
liability.,,178 
Second, the Court laid bare and grappled with Dow's policy arguments, 
joined in by the United States as amicus, that tort liability going forward, 
coupled with EPA regulation, would lead to over-deterrence. The Court 
acknowledged that "[0 ]verenforcement of FIFRA's misbranding prohibition 
creates a risk of imposing unnecessary financial burdens on 
manufacturers." 179 But that risk was outweighed, said the Court, because 
"under-enforcement creates not only financial risks for consumers, but risks 
that affect their safety and the environment as welI.,,180 The Court added 
that "[p ]rivate remedies that enforce federal misbranding requirements 
173. [d. (quoting Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 513 (O'Connor, 1., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part». 
174. [d. (emphasis in original). Later in the opinion the Court adds a measure of clarity to the 
inquiry on equivalence in a way that tilts the scales in favor of preserving state law. "To survive pre-
emption, the state-law requirement need not be phrased in the identical language as its 
corresponding FIFRA requirement; indeed, it would be surprising if a common-law requirement 
used the same phraseology as FIFRA." [d. at 1804. 
175. [d. at 1801. 
176. [d. 
177. [d. at 1802. 
178. [d. 
179. [d. 
180. [d. 
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would seem to aid, rather than hinder, the functioning of FIFRA.,,181 State 
tort actions '''may aid in the exposure of new dangers associated with 
pesticides,'" may prompt EPA to "'decide that revised labels are required in 
light of the new information that has been brought to its attention, '" and may 
"'provide manufacturers with added dynamic incentives to continue to keep 
abreast of all possible injuries stemming from use of their product so as to 
forestall such actions through product improvement. ,,, 182 
These arguments, which carried considerable weight in Bates, apply 
with even greater force to the MDA. After all, the MDA was enacted in 
response to a massive regulatory failure brought to light by tort litigation, 
and there is no hint in the text or legislative history of the MDA that 
Congress intended "to deprive injured parties of a long available form of 
compensation." 183 Nonetheless, the courts remain fractured on whether the 
MDA preempts state damages actions in cases involving products 
specifically approved by the FDA. Since no MDA preemption case has been 
decided post-Bates, it is too soon to tell whether courts will take their cue 
from Bates. In the meantime, however, it is clear that lower courts have not 
faithfully followed Medtronic, creating disarray in the interpretation of the 
MDA. 
III. LOWER COURTS SHOULD APPLY MEDTRONIC'S PARALLEL 
REQUIREMENTS TEST 
Medtronic establishes a narrow rule of preemption. As the plurality 
opinion put it, "given the critical importance of device specificity in our (and 
the FDA's) construction of § 360k [the MDA preemption provision], it is 
apparent that few, if any, common-law duties have been pre-empted by this 
statute.,,184 The MDA preempts state law when, but only when, (1) there are 
specific requirements for a device (2) that are imposed by both federal and 
state law, and (3) that are in conflict. 185 Generality on either side of the 
equation defeats preemption, as do federal and state requirements that 
impose parallel and consistent obligations. 186 To illustrate this point, Justice 
181. [d. 
182. [d. (quoting Ferebee v. Chevron Chern. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1541-42 (D.C. Cir. 1984». One 
might question why a history of litigation bears on the preemption question and how specific that 
litigation has to be in order to count against preemption. The Court in Bates addresses these 
concerns. As to the basic question why litigation history matters, the Court's answer in Bates 
dovetails with the general proposition that when Congress "intend[s] to deprive injured parties of a 
long available form of compensation," it "express[es] that intent more clearly." Id. at 1801; see also 
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 {I 984). The history oflitigation goes to whether 
a preemption ruling would upset settled expectations and deprive injured parties oftort remedies that 
had long been available. As to the specificity of this litigation, the Bates Court was careful to 
suggest that litigation in the same general area, and not over the specific product, would suffice. 
Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 180 I. After all, the relevant yardstick in Bates was not specific litigation against 
pesticide manufacturers for crop damage, but was instead the more general "history of tort litigation 
against the manufacturers of poisonous substances." [d. 
183. Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1792. 
184. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 502 (l996) (plurality opinion). 
185. See id. at 506-07. 
186. See id. at 502, 507. 
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Breyer offered the example of a federal requirement that hearing aid wires 
be two inches in length, preempting a common-law claim based on a specific 
state requirement for a one-inch wire. 187 Under those circumstances, 
compliance with both federal and state requirements would be impossible 
and thus preemption makes sense. The existence of conflicting requirements 
is the essence of the preemption holding in Medtronic, as Justice Breyer's 
illustration makes plain. Regrettably, some lower courts have failed to 
adhere to this rule. 188 
Typical of the decisions that have strayed from Medtronic is the Third 
Circuit's ruling in Horn v. Thoratec Corporation. 189 Horn involved the 
failure of a device called the HeartMate, which "is a pump that assists the 
blood flow between the heart's ventricle and the aorta in patients with 
cardiac conditions.,,19o Barbara Hom's husband, Daniel Hom, suffered a 
heart attack and his doctors determined that he needed a heart transplant. 191 
While waiting for a suitable donor heart to become available, Mr. Hom's 
condition deteriorated and a HeartMate was implanted in him to provide 
circulatory support. 192 He "began to bleed from the spot where the 
HeartMate" had been implanted and underwent exploratory surgery that 
revealed that the pump had become disconnected. 193 The disconnection had 
allowed an air embolus to travel to Mr. Hom's brain, causing a fatal brain 
hemorrhage. 194 
Ms. Hom alleged that the HeartMate was defectively designed and 
manufactured, and that the company had failed to warn patients and 
physicians of the defects. 195 The district court dismissed the action in its 
entirety on preemption grounds, and the Third Circuit, in a two-to-one 
ruling, affirmed. 196 
The majority first found that the pre-marketing approval (PMA) process, 
in which the FDA approves the design of Class III medical devices, 
culminated in the imposition of federal "requirements.,,197 This ruling was 
187. [d. at 504 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
188. Compare, e.g., Oja v. Howmedica, Inc., III F.3d 782, 789 (lOth Cir. 1997), and Goodlin v. 
Medtronic, Inc., 167 F.3d 1367 (11th Cir. 1999) (conducting the Medtronic preemption inquiry and 
finding no preemption), with Hom v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2004), Martin v. 
Medtronic, Inc., 254 F.3d 573 (5th Cir. 2001), and Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., 126 F.3d 902, 911 
(7th Cir. 1997) (looking only at the specificity of the federal requirements and finding preemption 
notwithstanding the generality of the state requirements at issue). 
189. 376 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2004). 
190. /d. at 164. 
191. [d. at 165. 
192. [d. 
193. [d. 
194. Jd. 
195. Jd. 
196. Jd. at 164. 
197. Jd. at 171. 
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in error. Obtaining a license to sell a product - even through a process as 
rigorous as FDA PMA review - does not result in the imposition of a 
federal "requirement.,,198 Unless the FDA has set out specific regulations 
specifying the design standards for a particular device (which is almost 
invariably not the case) the manufacturer may select the design, 
manufacturing, fabrication and labeling features that will satisfy the 
minimum and general standards set forth in the MDA and its implementing 
regulations. 199 The FDA's job is to ensure that there is a "reasonable 
assurance" that the resulting product is safe and effective for its intended 
use. 200 The FDA plays no initiating role in the design of medical devices or 
how they are manufactured or labeled. 201 Nor does the FDA have the 
authority to determine whether the design is optimal from a public health 
standpoint, or even whether there are safer and more effective devices 
already on the market. 202 So long as a device meets the statutory standards, 
the FDA has no choice but to approve it. This point is critical, but it is 
generally overlooked. 203 
Not only was the Horn court wrong to find "requirements" on the 
federal side of the equation, it compounded its error by concluding that state 
common law duties are sufficiently specific to the HeartMate to trigger 
preemption. 204 As the Horn court saw it, although the Medtronic 
plurality opinion did not inform us of when common law 
requirements may become substantive requirements, we are 
satisfied that Horn's general state law claims would impose 
substantive requirements on [the manufacturer] that would conflict 
with, or add to, the requirements imposed by the FDA involved in 
the design, manufacturing, fabrication and labeling of the 
HeartMate. 205 
Key to the court's conclusion was its assumption that a design defect 
liability finding against the company "unquestionably would require" it to 
redesign its product along the line advocated by Horn's experts. 206 But that 
assumption confuses the imposition of a device-specific requirement that 
comes through positive state enactments and the indirect effect of tort 
198. See 21 C.F.R. § 812.2 (2005) (discussing the applicability of the FDA requirements). 
199. See generally 21 C.F.R. §§ 812, 814 (2005) (laying out the federal regulations and procedure 
for medical devices). 
200. 21 U.S.c. § 360e(d)(2)(A)-(B) (2000). 
201. See 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d). 
202. [d. 
203. !d. These limitations on its authority place the FDA in a vastly different position than, for 
instance, the Defense Department when it contracts for the production of military equipment. See, 
e.g., Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988) (creating federal common law immunity 
from tort liability for contractor who produced, according to government specifications, a helicopter 
for the United States Marine Corps). 
204. See Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2004). 
205. [d. at 176. 
206. [d. 
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judgments. 207 An adverse jury ruling in Horn would not have required the 
device's manufacturer to do anything at all, other than to pay money 
damages. Of course, a manufacturer might decide to take measures to avoid 
a recurrence of the device's failure that lead to Mr. Hom's death or to better 
inform physicians and patients of the risks associated with the device. But 
the manufacturer could also decide to do nothing, reasoning that the 
likelihood of recurrence is too remote to justify any change in the product's 
design, manufacture, or labeling. 
Horn cannot be squared with the Court's more recent preemption 
jurisprudence, which makes clear that jury verdicts are generally not 
sufficiently prescriptive to impose "requirements" for preemption purposes. 
This point was pivotal in both Sprietsma and Bates. In Sprietsma, the Court 
rejected the manufacturer's argument that a jury award based on the finding 
that motor-boats lacking propeller guards were defectively designed would 
force it to install guards, notwithstanding the Coast Guard's failure to 
require them. 208 And in Bates the Court rejected Dow's contention that a 
finding that Stongarm was negligently designed and marketed in areas with 
soil with pH levels of above 7.2 would necessarily force it to modify labels 
the EPA had approved. 209 As Bates drives home, "an event, such as a jury 
verdict, that merely motivates an optional decision is not a requirement.,,210 
It may be that lower courts will begin to interpret Medtronic through the 
lens provided by Bates and Sprietsma and become more discerning in 
reviewing preemption claims. But there is reason to think that they will not. 
As part of his "tort reform" campaign, President George W. Bush has 
pressed Executive Branch agencies to push for broad interpretations of 
preemption provisions in regulatory statutes. 2l1 The FDA has been on the 
207. Id. at 184 (Fuentes, J., dissenting) (noting that "[i]t is true that Hom's cause of action may 
have the indirect consequence of holding the HeartMate to a higher standard than does the FDA, but 
this consequence is sanctioned by Part V of the [Medtronic v.] Lohr opinion and not expressly barred 
by Justice Breyer's concurrence."). 
208. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 V.S. 51,65-67 (2002). 
209. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, LLC, 125 S. Ct. 1788, 1799 (2005). 
210. /d. 
211. See Margaret H. Clune, Stealth Tort Reform: How the Bush Administration's Aggressive Use 
of the Preemption Doctrine Hurts Consumers, Center for Progressive Regulation White Paper 403 
(Oct. 2004) at 7-9, available at http://www.progressiveregulation.orglarticles/preemption.pdf 
(arguing that the Bush Administration has pursued tort reform through legal means largely hidden 
from public view rather than through asking Congress to change the laws). As a Scholar with the 
Center, I assisted Ms. Clune in the preparation of that White Paper. 
It bears noting that the Administration's pro-preemption campaign is not limited to the FDA. 
Two illustrations should suffice. First, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency has been 
roundly criticized for issuing a regulation that broadly preempts state consumer-protection laws 
enacted to curb an epidemic of predatory lending. Nicholas Bagley, Note, The Unwarranted 
Regulatory Preemption of Predatory Lending Laws, 79 N.Y.V. L. Rev. 2274, 2275 (2004) (arguing 
that the agency, in promUlgating its regulation, 12 C.F .R. § 34.4(a)(2004), "overstepped its 
congressionally delegated authority" and urging courts "to strike it down in order to leave space for 
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front line of this campaign, both reversing its longstanding view that the 
MDA preemption provision applies only in exceptional circumstances, and 
aggressively presenting its new pro-preemption views in court. 212 In Horn, 
for instance, the FDA filed an amicus brief strongly supporting the 
manufacturer's position, and the court relied heavily on the FDA's views in 
holding Ms. Hom's claims preempted.213 Just as the Supreme Court rejected 
the Bush Administration's effort to reverse the long-held government 
position on the preemptive scope of FIFRA, so too should lower courts be 
skeptical of the FDA's new pro-preemption campaign. 
IV. COURTS SHOULD REJECT THE FDA's PRO-PREEMPTION PUSH 
Like most federal agencies, the FDA has historically resisted becoming 
enmeshed in private products liability litigation.214 Although the FDA has 
on occasion provided the courts with its view on the meaning of the statutes 
it enforces and the regulations it has promulgated, it rarely sought to inject 
itself into private litigation, that is, until the administration of President 
George W. Bush. 215 Since then, the FDA has accomplished a complete 
transformation of its position on the preemptive scope of the MDA and has 
actively solicited guidance from pharmaceutical and medical device firms 
about pending lawsuits in which the FDA could participate to press its pro-
preemption position. 216 At last count, the FDA has asked for leave to 
participate as an amicus in at least four cases, and in each case, it has urged 
the court to find the plaintiffs' state law damage claims preempted. 217 
state legislatures and Congress to develop and test novel responses to the growing problem of 
abusive lending"). Second, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, taking its cue from 
Geier, see supra note 137, has argued that the auto safey regulations it is developing should broadly 
preempt state damage actions. See. e.g., Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Roof Crush 
Resistance, 70 Fed. Reg. 49223, 49245 (Aug. 23, 2005) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pI. 571) 
(proposing regulation to upgrade the agency's safety standard on roof crush resistance and 
suggesting the new standard, if adopted, will preempt state damage actions); Federal Motor Vehicle 
Safety Standards; Designated Seating Positions and Seat Belt Assembly Anchorages, 70 Fed. Reg. 
36,094,36,094,36,102 (June 22,2005) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pI. 571.3) (proposing regulation 
to amend the definition of "designated seating position," to revise requirements for anchoring seat 
beats, "to establish a new procedure for determining the number of designated seating positions on 
bench and split bench seats;" suggesting that the new standard, if adopted, will preempt state damage 
actions). 
212. See Horn, 376 F.3d at 177-80. 
213. /d. 
214. See Clune, supra note 211, at 1-3. 
215. See generally Clune, supra note 211. 
216. In an FDA publication, the FDA's Chief Counsel, Daniel E. Troy, announced that the FDA 
would "participate in product liability lawsuits brought under state law as necessary to safeguard [the 
agency's] considerable expertise in regulating the content of drug labeling and advertising." Daniel 
E. Troy, FDA Involvement in Product Liability Lawsuits. UPDATE, Jan.-Feb. 2003, at 7-8. Mr. Troy 
repeated that comment to an audience of several hundred lawyers representing the drug and medical 
device industries, where he urged the attendees to suggest lawsuits in which the agency might 
intervene. Mr. Troy apparently cautioned the attendees that the FDA "can't afford to get involved in 
every case," so interested attorneys should, in their dealings with the FDA, "make it sound like a 
Hollywood pitch." See Affidavit of Jessica R. Dart, '1\ 5, Dusek v. Pfizer, No. H-02-3559, 2004 WL 
2191804 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2004». 
217. Motus v. Pfizer, Inc., 358 F.3d 659, 660 (9th Cir. 2004); Dowhal v. SmithKline Beecham 
Consumer Healthcare, 88 P.3d I (Cal. 2004); In re Paxil Litigation, 2002 WL 31375497 (C.D. Cal. 
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There is no dispute that the FDA's new position on the scope of the 
MDA preemption provision represents a I80-degree shift of position for the 
agency. In Medtronic itself, the FDA took the position that the scope of the 
MDA preemption provision was quite narrow and was not intended to 
displace state tort law remedies. 218 More significant, however, is an FDA 
amicus brief filed by the Solicitor General in Smith Industries Medical 
Systems, Inc. v. Kernats, in response to a request from the Supreme Court. 219 
In Kernats, the Solicitor General rejected the suggestion that the pre-market 
approval process preempts remedies for injuries caused by a defective 
medical device, arguing that neither federal nor state law impose 
requirements specific to the medical device at issue. 22o On the federal side, 
preemption occurs only when "the FDA determines that precise design, 
manufacturing, or labeling specifications are necessary [and it] ... impose[s] 
such requirements through the promulgation of specific regulations .... We 
have been informed by the FDA that it imposes such specific requirements 
on Class III devices only in extraordinary situations," that were not present 
in the case. 221 On the state side of the ledger, the MDA preemption 
provision is "inapplicable in the circumstances of this case because [the 
manufacturer] has not shown that common law imposes a substantive 
requirement specifically with respect to the medical device at issue here.,,222 
Those observations would have applied precisely to the circumstances in 
Horn, and indeed universally in the MDA preemption cases decided post-
Medtronic. 223 
2002); Murphree v. Pacesetter, et. aI., No. 005429-00-3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 12,2003), as Ex. A in 
Mem. in Supp. of Mot. Summ. J., Downes v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 05-80746, at 3 (D. Fla. 2005). 
Although the FDA did not initiate its participation in Horn v. Thoratec, the Third Circuit requested 
that it submit a brief after the Horn defendant submitted the FDA's briefs in Murphee and urged the 
Third Circuit to defer to the pro-preemption position outlined in the Murphee briefs. Horn, 376 F.3d 
at 171 & n.13. In Motus and Dowhal, the FDA argued for broad preemption of failure to warn 
claims with respect to pharmaceutical products, even though the drug provisions of the Food, Drug 
and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) do not contain an express preemption provision, and even though the 
courts had not previously entertained such claims. See Brief of Public Citizen as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Cross-Appellee at 13, Motus v. Pfizer, 358 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 2004) (Nos. 02-55372, 02-
55498), 2003 WL 22716063, at * 13 (arguing that "since enactment of the FDCA 65 years ago, no 
reported decision has held that the Act preempts common-law damages actions with respect to 
drugs."). The Court in Motus did not reach the preemption question. Motus, 358 F.3d at 660. 
218. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents/Cross-Petitioner, 
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996) (Nos. 95-754, 95-886), 1996 WL 118035 (arguing for 
a narrow reading of the MDA preemption provision). 
219. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Smith Indus. Med. Sys. v. Kemats, 669 N.E.2d 
1300 (111. App. 1996) (No. 96-1405) [hereinafter Brief for the United States, Kemats]. The lower 
court opinion is set forth at 669 N.E.3d 1300 (Ill. App. 1996). 
220. Id. 
221. Brief for the United States, Kemats, supra note 219, at 15. 
222. Id. at 17. 
223. Shortly after the Court handed down its decision in Medtronic, FDA Chief Counsel Margaret 
Porter noted that the Court's non-preemption ruling in Medtronic was consistent with the FDA's 
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Notwithstanding the clarity of the FDA's position in Kernats and the 
absence of any change in the law - statutory, regulatory, or decisional -
that might explain a reversal of field, the FDA now takes the diametrically 
opposite position. Relying principally on policy arguments, the agency 
claims that the MDA broadly preempts state-law damage claims not "only in 
extraordinary situations," but indeed in every instance where the device has 
received pre-market approval by the FDA. 224 The fact that the FDA's 
position would leave injured consumers without a remedy is apparently not a 
matter of concern. According to the FDA, "[s]tate common law tort actions 
threaten the statutory framework for the regulation of medical devices," 
because tort relief in the form of damage awards could pressure 
manufacturers to alter the device's design or to add warnings the FDA had 
not approved. 225 The FDA also warned that "individualized redetermination 
of the benefits and risks of a product" in tort cases could harm the public 
health by "resulting in scientifically unsubstantiated warnings and 
underutilization of beneficial treatments.,,226 These are the arguments that 
the FDA made in Horn, and they were endorsed by the panel majority. 227 
Courts should be leery of the FDA's pro-preemption campaign for three 
reasons. First, simply as a matter of administrative law, courts owe no 
deference to the agency's current view of the law, especially when it 
contradicts an interpretation the agency has held for more than twenty years 
and is reflected in a substantive agency regulation. 228 Indeed, the Supreme 
Court recently rejected a similar effort by the Bush Administration to reverse 
field on a preemption issue but nonetheless claim that its new position is 
entitled to deference. 229 In Bates, the Court noted that the Administration 
"longstanding ... presumption against preemption." Margaret Jane Porter, The Lohr Decision: FDA 
Perspective and Position, 52 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 7, at 7, 10 (1997). Ms. Porter added 
[g]iven the harsh implications of foreclosing all judicial recourse for consumers injured 
by defective medical devices, FDA does not believe that Congress intended to effect so 
sweeping change without even a comment. Rather, the agency believes that Congress 
intended to restrict preemption to positive enactments (for example, legislation or 
regulations) that apply to the marketing of medical devices within a state, and did not 
intend to preempt state tort remedies for injury to individual consumers. 
/d. at 9. 
224. Briefforthe United States, Kemats, supra note 219, at 15. 
225. Horn, 376 F.3d at 177-78 (quoting Letter Brief of Amicus Curiae United States, at 25-26, 
2004 WL 1143720). 
226. [d. 
227. /d. at 177-80. 
228. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228-32 (2001). Mead gives new 
weight to the rule that courts owe substantial deference to an agency's interpretation of a statute set 
forth in a regulation promulgated after notice and comment rulemaking. In contrast, Mead cautioned 
courts against giving deference to agency interpretations arrived at through less formal means. [d. at 
234-35. Post-Mead, a court confronted with the FDA's current position on preemption would be 
bound to defer to the agency's regulation, which remains on the books, and may be modified or 
rescinded only through a formal rulemaking that addresses the comments submitted by interested 
parties. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (2000) (defining "rulemaking" as the "agency process for 
formulating, amending, or repealing a rule"). 
229. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 125 S. Ct. 1788 (2005). 
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had changed its position on the preemptive scope of FIFRA, and gave no 
weight to the pro-preemption arguments in the agency's brief. 230 
Second, and more fundamentally, the FDA's new position cannot be 
squared with its long-standing preemption regulation, which the agency has 
not amended. The FDA's existing regulation states that preemption is 
limited to instances in which the FDA "has established specific counterpart 
regulations or there are other specific requirements applicable to a particular 
device" or class of devices. 231 The regulation also provides that the MDA 
"does not preempt State or local requirements of general applicability where 
the purpose of the requirements relates either to other products in addition to 
devices ... or to unfair trade practices in which the requirements are not 
limited to devices.,,232 The FDA has never questioned the continued validity 
of this regulation, but it has also never explained how its views can be 
reconciled with it. Perhaps for good reason. The thrust of the regulation, as 
the Court recognized in Medtronic and as the Solicitor General explained in 
Kernats, is to ensure that preemption occurs only when there are 
inconsistent, device-specific requirements imposed by both the FDA and the 
state - an occurrence that is an exception, not the rule, as the FDA now 
claims. 233 
Third, there is a serious cost to the FDA's pro-preemption campaign that 
should be considered as well. The press has covered the FDA's campaign 
extensively, questioning whether an agency that takes extraordinary 
measures to insulate from liability the industry it is supposed to regulate best 
serves the public's interest. 234 From this perspective, the FDA's campaign 
230. !d. at 1794 n.7, 1801. 
231. 21 C.F.R. § 808.I(d). 
232. Id. at § 808.l(d)(I). 
233. The only effort the FDA makes to defend its pro-preemption provision in light of its 
regulation is to claim that pre-market approval constitutes a specific federal requirement because 
once approved, the device's "attributes are fixed in place, as they can be materially changed only 
with FDA approval." See Brieffor United States as Amicus Curiae at 19-17, Horn v. Thoratec, Inc., 
376 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2004) (No. 02-4597), 2004 WL 1143720. But this argument is a non-starter. 
The same was true of the grandfathered device in Medtronic, and indeed all Class JII medical 
devices; once approved by the FDA, a manufacturer may not alter a device's design without FDA 
approval. 21 C.F.R. §§ 807.8 I (a)(3)(I), 814.39(a) (2005). 
234. The FDA's campaign to intervene in product liability litigation on behalf of medical device 
and pharmaceutical manufacturers has been widely covered in the press. For a representative 
sampling of articles, see, for example, Clune, supra note 211, at I n.1 (citing Robert Pear, In a Shift. 
Bush Moves to Block Medical Suits. N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2004, at AI; Robert Cohen, FDA Stepping 
Into Liability Lawsuits on Side of Drug Makers it Regulates, THE SEATTLE TIMES, May 11,2004, at 
AI; Patrick McGann, FDA's Chief Lawyer Stands Up for the Big Guys, LEWISTON MORNING 
TRIBUNE, July 31, 2004, at lOA; Anne C. Mulkern, Watchdogs or Lapdogs? When Advocates 
Become Regulators President Bush Has Installed More Than 100 Top Officials Who Were Once 
Lobbyists. Attorneys or Spokespeople for the Industries They Oversee, THE DENVER POST, May 23, 
2004, at AI; Gary Young, FDA Strategy Would Pre-empt Tort Suits: Does it Close OjJVital Drug 
Data?, NAT. L.J., Mar. 1,2004). Members of Congress were also troubled by the FDA's efforts to 
support industry in preemption cases. Representative Maurice Hinchey (D - NY) introduced 
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was not well-timed. In the past few years, the FDA has experienced perhaps 
its worst period of regulatory failure with medical devices. The irony is 
palpable. The FDA's pro-preemption story is that the FDA is perfectly 
capable of ensuring, single-handedly, safe and effective medical devices. 
Imposing tort liability on medical device manufacturers, the FDA argues, 
interferes with the agency's ability to protect the public health because the 
FDA alone should define the duties that device manufacturers must live up 
to. But the agency's shift in position has coincided with a stream of highly 
publicized recalls of defective medical devices, including stents, 
pacemakers, defibrillators, and infusion pumps.235 These defective products 
have exacted a serious toll on public health, and the publicity attending their 
removal from the market has undermined public confidence in the agency. 
This experience has shown that the FDA's rhetoric does not match its 
record. Regulation alone is far from an adequate guarantee of safety, which 
is why Congress did not intend to nullify state damages law when it enacted 
the MDA. 
V. PREEMPTION IN A TIME OF REGULATORY FAILURE 
In the debate over MDA preemption, the medical device industry is 
fighting to shed a discipline that state tort law imposes on its conduct and to 
avoid financial accountability for its mistakes. 236 Tort liability serves two 
legislation to cut $500,000 from the budget of the FDA's Chief Counsel's office; the amount Rep. 
Hinchey estimated the FDA spent supporting industry in preemption litigation. 150 CONGo REc. 
H5598 (daily ed. July 13,2004) (remarks of Rep. Hinchey). 
235. See, e.g., Reed Abelson, Boston Scientific Expands Recall of Troubled Stent, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 6, 2004, at C5 (recall of over 100,000 of Boston Scientific stents); Barnaby J. Feder, J. & J. 
Recalls 300 Heart Stents After Defects Are Found in 6, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.14, 2005, at C5 (recall of 
over 300 Johnson & Johnson stents); Ben Harder, Heart Device Recall; For Patients With Suspect 
Models, Tough Choices, WASH. POST, June 28, 2005, at FI (reporting effects of recall of nearly 
50,000 Guidant defibrillators and over 100,000 Medtronic defibrillators); Ashley M. Heher, Guidant 
Recalls Heart Devices; Defibrillator Supplier Cites Malfunction Risk, WASH. POST, June 18,2005, 
at D I (reporting same recall of Guidant Defibrillator); Barry Meier, Pacemakers by Guidant Have 
Flaw, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2005, at CI (recall of nine other models of Guidant defibrillators); 
Company Recalls Blood Vessel Devices, N.Y. TiMES, June 28, 2005, at CI (recall of Boston 
Scientific vascular grafts); Associated Press, Guidant Issues Second Defibrillator Warning, L.A. 
TiMES C3, (June 25, 2005) (Guidant recall of defibrillators); Reuters, FDA Classifies Recall by 
Guidant as Serious, L.A. TiMES, July 23, 2005, at C3 (Guidant's defibrillator recall classified as 
most dangerous type by FDA); Gardiner Harris, F.D.A. Orders Recall of Intravenous Pumps, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 22, 2005, at AI2 (Baxter Healthcare recall of all of its Colleague Volumetric Infusion 
Pumps because they may shut down unexpectedly); Class I Recall Issued For Baxter Infusion 
Pumps,2 FDAnews Device Daily Bulletin (No. 144, July 22, 2005); Medtronic Recalls Faulty Drug 
Infusion Pumps in UK, 31 Devices & Diagnostics Letter (No. 24, June 14, 2004) (Medtronic 
infusion pumps recalled due to possible software problems); Recalls Continue to Plague Guidant's 
CRM Line, 32 Devices & Diagnostics Letter (No. 30, Aug. I, 2005) (Guidant recalled twenty 
models of defibrillators and pacemakers). 
236. See Robert J. Katerberg, Patching the "Crazy Quilt" of Cipollone: A Divided Court Rethinks 
Federal Preemption of Products Liability in Medtronic, Inc. V. Lohr, 75 N.C. L. REv. 1440, 1495 & 
n.343 (1997) (noting that "[t]he medical products industry has unsuccessfully lobbied Congress for 
legislation that would directly immunize manufacturers who complied with federal standards from 
products liability lawsuits."); see also Valerie Watnick, Federal Preemption ~f Tort Claims Under 
FIFRA: The Erosion of A Defense, 36 MICH. J.L. REFORM 419,441 (2003) (explaining that "one of 
the congressional purposes of the MDA had been to reign in an industry in need of more, not less, 
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important and related functions unserved by regulation: tort liability 
compensates those injured by products found to impose an unjustified risk 
and, in so doing, it deters excessive risk-taking by forcing the risk-taker to 
absorb the costs that come with marketing a product that imposes an 
unjustifiable risk of harm. Because the functions served by tort law are a 
complement to, but not a substitute for, the functions served by regulation, 
the burden on proponents of preemption to demonstrate that Congress 
intended to remove the discipline of the tort system imposes should be high. 
For garden-variety regulatory statutes like the MDA, which assign 
regulatory primacy to federal agencies but do not address liability, that 
burden should be virtually insurmountable. 
Once again, the MDA is a paradigmatic case. The idea that Congress, 
when it enacted the MDA, intended to displace tort law altogether is hard to 
reconcile with a number of considerations that are too often overlooked in 
MDA preemption litigation: 
First, nothing in the MDA says that Congress intended to deprive 
consumers injured by defective medical products compensation. Unlike 
statutes like the Price-Anderson Act, the Vaccine Act, or the 9/11 
Compensation Fund, the MDA provides neither a federal right of action nor 
a system of compensating injured parties. 237 A finding of preemption 
simultaneously immunizes industry for its errors and deprives injured 
consumers of compensation that historically has been available. 
Second, there is no preemption of state damage claims under the drug 
provisions of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, to which the MDA is an 
amendment. 238 Had Congress wanted to make such a dramatic change to 
existing law, it would have said SO.239 
Third, although it is generally referred to as a public health statute, the 
MDA is not designed to optimize public health. It is a licensing statute that 
trades off public health imperatives for the benefit of medical device 
manufacturers, as is illustrated by the following examples: 
* The MDA does not instruct the FDA to approve only the "best" 
medical devices, or to determine whether there are better or more effective 
devices available. 240 To the contrary, if a device meets the statutory tests of 
oversight, and that a broad interpretation of the MOA's preemptive scope would not further this 
legislative goaL"). 
237. See 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (2000) (Price-Anderson Act); 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to 300aa-34 
(2000) (National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986); 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (Supp. 2004) (Air 
Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act of2001). 
238. See Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (2000). 
239. See generally Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 228 (1999) ("Congress is unlikely to 
intend any radical departures from past practice without making a point of saying so."). 
240. Like many regulatory statutes, the MOA sets performance standards and does not impose 
design standards. This choice reflects a growing preference for non-prescriptive regulation that 
leaves the decision of how best to achieve statutory or regulation goals to the regulated entity. See 
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safety and efficacy, the FDA must approve it, even if there are better and 
safer products on the market, and even if the FDA knows that the device's 
design is not optimal. As the examples of recently-recalled products show, 
faulty devices are approved by the FDA in spite of the rigorous pre-market 
approval process. 241 
* Devices are not "term limited." Devices are approved indefinitely. 
Once they are on the market they are not subject to periodic review, and they 
are not subject to withdrawal even if they are superseded by superior 
products. The MDA presumes that the market, and not FDA regulation, will 
weed out devices rendered obsolete by newer, safer, and more effective 
ones. 
* The MDA does not require adequate reporting of problems with 
medical devices to the FDA; device manufacturers ordinarily file reports 
annually and those reports are not made available to physicians or the 
public. 242 
* The MDA gives the FDA only limited authority to deal with defective 
devices, and the FDA has invoked this authority sparingly. To order any 
kind of relief, the agency must determine that the device is not simply 
defective, but that it "presents an unreasonable risk of substantial harm to 
generally Thomas O. McGarity, Media-Quality. Technology. and Cost-Benefit Balancing Strategies 
Jar Health and Environmental Regulation, L. & Contemp. Prob., Summer 1983, at 159,162-64. For 
this reason, the presumption against preemption should be at its zenith when an agency's organic 
statute directs the imposition of performance standards. In those instances, by definition, the 
regulated entity retains a high degree of freedom in determining how best to meet the demands of 
regulation, and thus it is unlikely that tort liability will interfere with, much less conflict with, federal 
regulatory goals. 
241. See, e.g., Abelson, supra note 235, at C5; Harder, supra note 235, at FI. 
242. The MDA gives the FDA discretion to mandate reporting on medical devices. 21 U.S.C. § 
360i (2000); see also id. § 3601 (post-marketing surveillance authority). The FDA reporting 
requirements are set forth in 21 C.F.R. Part 803, and recently were strengthened by the FDA, 
effective July 2005. See Medical Device Reporting, 70 Fed. Reg. 9516 (Feb. 28, 2005) (to be 
codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 803). Under these requirements, manufacturers have thirty days to report a 
defect that may be life threatening, and five days to report a defect that "necessitates remedial action 
to prevent an unreasonable risk of substantial harm to the public health." Id. at 9520. "Baseline" 
reports that describe the number of devices sold and the performance of the devices are filed 
annually, and most of those reports are withheld because they are considered confidential business 
information. Id. at 9522; see Barry Meier, F.D.A. Will Not Release Some Data on Heart Devices, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2005, at C3 (reporting that the FDA rejected a request under the Freedom of 
Information Act to obtain medical device reports); Barry Meier, A Choice Jar the Heart; It's Easier 
to Get Data on a Car Than on a Medical Device, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2005, at CI (noting 
complaints by physicians that, in contrast to pharmaceutical products, there is no comparative data 
available on the safety, effectiveness, or reliability of medical devices). Manufacturers are required 
to report device malfunctions that, if they recur, could lead to serious injury or death. Records and 
Reports on Devices, 21 U.S.C. § 360i(a)(l)(B); Medical Device Reporting, 21 C.F.R. § 803.50(a)(2) 
(2005) (requiring manufacturers to file a report within thirty days when a device it has manufactured 
"malfunctioned and such device or similar device marketed by the manufacturer would be likely to 
cause or contribute to a death or serious injury, if the malfunction were to recur"). Manufacturers 
must also report, within five working days, events that suggest a "trend" requiring remedial action to 
protect public helath. Medical Device Reporting, 21 C.F.R. § 803.53(a) (2005). And manufacturers 
are required to report "promptly" any "correction" of a medical device undertaken by the 
manufacturer to "reduce a risk to health posed by the device .... " 21 U.S.C. § 360i(f)(l)(A); 21 
C.F.R. § 806.l0(a)(l). 
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public health.,,243 As best as I could detennine, the FDA has never exercised 
its power to recall a defective medical device, although it has used the threat 
of a recall to force device manufacturers to withdraw defective devices from 
the market. 
The point of this list is not to critique the MDA. Rather, it is to show 
that the regulatory screen erected by the MDA is far from airtight. Devices 
that do more hann than good will continue to reach consumers. Even a well-
intentioned and diligent FDA cannot prevent dangerous and defective 
devices from entering the marketplace and doing serious hann to consumers. 
Furthennore, once the FDA approval process has unleashed a dangerous 
device into the market, the FDA's authority to address that situation is far 
from comprehensive. 244 All of this was known to Congress when it enacted 
the MDA, and these limitations strongly support the proposition that 
Congress intended the MDA to operate against the backdrop of existing tort 
law, which provides an independent and important discipline on the market. 
The same critique could be applied with equal force to any of the 
regulatory statutes that are now preemption battlegrounds. Indeed, if 
243. 21 U.S.c. § 360h. Once the FDA determines that a device "presents an unreasonable risk of 
substantial harm to the public health," it may require device manufacturers to notify health care 
providers and device recipients of the defect. Id. § 360h(a}. In non-implanted devices, the agency 
can also order the company to repair, replace, or provide a refund. Id. § 360h(b}. The agency also 
has authority, added to the MDA in 1992, to order a recall of defective devices after (I) finding that 
"there is a reasonable probability that a device intended for human use would cause serious, adverse 
health consequences or death," and (2) "providing [the device manufacturer] an opportunity for an 
informal hearing." Id. § 360h(e)(I}, (2). Insofar as 1 can determine, the FDA has never exercised its 
authority under this provision of the Act, although it has apparently threatened to invoke this 
provision to press manufacturers to undertake "voluntary" recalls. But the FDA generally relies on 
market forces to prompt the recall of dangerous, defective devices. Typical is the tragic case of 
Bjork-Shiley heart valves. Between 1979 and 1986, Shiley, Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
Pfizer, Inc., manufactured a human-implant heart valve known as the Bjork-Shiley convexo/concave 
heart valve ("valve"). See Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 141, 147 (S.D. Ohio 1992). 
"Somewhere between 50,000 and 100,000 of the valves were implanted in patients .... " Id. By 
1992, approximately 450 of these valves had fractured resulting in approximately 300 deaths. Id. 
The valves were continuing to fracture at a rate considerably higher than comparable valves, due to a 
serious design defect. Id. As a result, hundreds of heart patients had to undergo risky surgery to 
explant the defective valve and replace it with a safer one. Id. The Shiley valves were withdrawn by 
the company only after years oflitigation, which culminated in a massive class action settlement. Id. 
at 147-48. 
244. These concerns put aside perennial problems that all federal safety agencies have with under-
funding and under-staffing. The FDA, which regulates one-quarter of the American economy, 
employs only around 9,000 people nationwide. Food and Drug Administration, 
http://www.fda.gov/oc/opacomlfdaI01/sldOI5.html (last visited Aug. 11, 2005). In addition to 
medical devices, these employees are responsible, among other things, for reviewing new drug 
applications, monitoring the safety of drugs on the market, inspecting drug manufacturing facilities, 
inspecting virtually all of the non-meat food products sold in this country (including imports), 
inspecting food processing facilities, regulating dietary supplements, overseeing the safety of the 
blood supply, and regulating biological and radiological products, as well as veterinary medicines 
and cosmetics. Id. 
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anything, the protections built into FIFRA,245 the National Traffic and Motor 
Vehicle Safety Act, 246 and the Federal Boat Safety Act247 are less 
comprehensive than those in the MDA. All of these statutes embody trade-
offs between public health concerns and the need to ensure a competitive 
marketplace that rewards innovation and quality. None of these statutes, 
standing alone, imposes a discipline on the marketplace sufficient to ensure 
a reasonable margin of safety, and nowhere in those statutes or their 
legislative histories does Congress suggest otherwise. These factors suggest 
that Congress enacted these statutes with the understanding that the 
background discipline of tort law would remain undisturbed. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
One way to bring the debate over preemption into sharp focus is to 
return for a moment to the tragic and premature death of Joshua Oukrop.248 
Assuming that the FDA's approach prevails, Joshua's family has no recourse 
at all; his death will be a tragedy marked only by the personal loss to his 
family and friends. Any claim his family might want to bring against the 
device's manufacturer will be preempted. The manufacturer will escape 
financial responsibility to Joshua's family. And because the FDA rarely 
imposes financial sanctions against device manufacturers, it is likely that the 
manufacturer will incur no financial loss for the defect in the device that 
caused Joshua's death. 249 Under the FDA's approach, the company has only 
weak financial incentives to withdraw a defective device from the market, 
little incentive to make changes to improve the device's safety, and almost 
no incentive to warn patients and physicians of possible defects. To be sure, 
new and better devices will, over time, supersede older and less efficient 
ones; but that is a consequence of market forces and not regulation. Nor do 
regulatory consequences necessarily flow from marketing a defective device. 
As noted above, the manufacturer had a duty to report Joshua's death to the 
FDA,250 a duty it apparently discharged. 251 Yet according to press reports, 
245. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (2000). 
246. National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966,49 U.S.C. §§ 30101-30169 (2000) . 
247. Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971, 46 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1484 (2000). 
248. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text. 
249. The FDA does have criminal and civil sanctions available to punish manufacturers who fail 
to submit timely reports or otherwise fail to meet their regulatory obligations. The Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act contains a provision governing "penalties," which permits the imposition of criminal 
and civil sanctions, including monetary penalities, for engaging in what the Act characterizes as 
"prohibited acts." See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 331 (2000) (setting forth 
"prohibited acts"); Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 333 (setting forth penalties 
for commiting prohibited acts). Recent press reports suggest that the FDA may have launched a 
criminal investigation to determine whether Guidant violated any law in the way it discharged its 
reporting duties with regard to this defibrillator. See Barry Meier, Guidant Case May Involve Crime 
Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2005, at CI. 
250. 21 U.S.C. § 360i(a)(1)(A) (2000). 
251. It is unclear whether the manufacturer reported earlier-detected failures with this device and 
whether it brought the severity of the risk of the failures to the FDA's attention. According to one 
press account, the manufacturer did submit reports of the device's malfunction to the FDA. But the 
company nonetheless continued to sell this model even after it had developed an improved model 
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although Guidant knew of the possible defect for three years prior to 
Joshua's death, it did not alert doctors and patients until Joshua died.252 In 
the meantime, nearly 25,000 of these devices were implanted in other 
patients. 253 And why not? Without the looming threat of tort liability, the 
company had little incentive - economic or regulatory - to do 
otherwise. 254 
Now assume that the FDA's preemption position is rejected, and that 
state damage claims are available to Joshua's family. 255 They will likely 
sue, and if they prevail, the manufacturer will bear financial responsibility to 
the family. Moreover, the manufacturer will have powerful incentives to 
monitor the performance of its devices and make improvements to respond 
to possible imperfections and to keep pace with innovation. This dynamic is 
not a product of regulation. It is a product of the tort system. As the Court 
emphasized in Bates, private remedies that reinforce and strengthen federal 
standards enhance, rather than hinder, the functioning of federal 
regulation. 256 State damages actions "may aid in the exposure of new 
that did not pose a risk of short-circuiting. Barry Meier, F.D.A. Will Not Release Some Data on 
Heart Devices, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2005, at B3. Nothing in the FDA's regulations appears to 
forbid this conduct by the manufacturer. Cf. 21 C.F.R. § 806.10 (2005) (requiring manufacturers to 
promptly report "corrections" made to medical devices, but not to remove uncorrected devices from 
the marketplace or to discontinue their sale). 
252. See, e.g., Barry Meier, New Report oj Problems at Guidant, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2005, at 
BI; Barry Meier, Maker oj Heart Device Kept Flaw From Doctors, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2005, at 
AI. 
253. Barry Meier, MakeroJHeart Device Kept Flaw From Doctors, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2005, 
at AI. 
254. To be fair to the company, it claims that the failure rate with this model defibrillator is on par 
with, or lower than, the failure rates of comparable devices. Barry Meier, Maker oj Heart Device 
Kept Flaw From Doctors, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2005, at AI. But the company's eventual recall of 
the device, coupled with the announcement that it will pay for replacement surgery, suggests that the 
company may be worried about a higher incidence of failures in the future. Barry Meier, New 
Report oj Problems at Guidant, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2005, at B13; Barry Meier, Citing Flaws, 
Maker Recalls Heart Devices, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2005, at AI. Moreover, the company's 
willingness to pay for replacement surgery suggests that the company may not be confident that 
courts will find personal injury claims by patients preempted. Barry Meier, Guidant Agrees to Pay 
Jor Defibrillator Replacements, N.Y. TIMES, June 17,2005, at C2. 
255. It is not far-fetched to suggest that with a robust tort system in place, Joshua might not have 
died. Recall that Guidant waited several years before notifying patients and physicians that this 
device contained a possible defect. Barry Meier, F.D.A. ReJuses to Release Some Data on Heart 
Devices, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2005, at B3. By that time, Guidant had produced a newer, defect-
free, defibrillator. Id. Given that Joshua was an otherwise young and healthy patient, Joshua and his 
physician might well have decided that the risk of the device's failure outweighed the risk of 
additional surgery to replace the Guidant defibrillator with a safer model. The right of patients and 
physicians to make informed judgments about such matters would form the core of a failure to warn 
case brought by Joshua's parents. But under a pro-preemption approach to the MDA, even though a 
common-law failure to warn theory would likely parallel the FDA's reporting and notification 
regulations, it would be preempted. One consequence of such an approach, of course, is that 
manufacturers like Guidant have little economic incentive to notify patients and physicians of a 
possible defect. 
256. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, LLC, 125 S. Ct. 1788, 1802 (2005). 
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dangers associated" with devices, may prompt manufacturers of the FDA to 
decide that modifications are "required in light of the new information that 
has been brought" to their attention by litigation, and may "provide 
manufacturers with added dynamic incentives to continue to keep abreast of 
all possible injuries stemming from use of their product so as to forestall 
such actions through product improvement.,,257 
As the Guidant defibrillator recall demonstrates, there are sound reasons 
why the tort and regulatory systems operate in tandem and place separate, 
albeit reinforcing, disciplines on the market. When functioning well, a 
regulatory system prevents injury and ensures products on the market have a 
favorable risk-reward profile. But the tort system is vital because far too 
often there are gaps that our regulatory agencies - even those as effective 
as the FDA - cannot fill. Perhaps in a perfect world one could expect the 
FDA to have immediate access to data enabling it to pinpoint and solve 
problems like a wiring flaw in a defibrillator, a defective lead in a 
pacemaker, or faulty welds in heart valves (the defect with the Shiley 
valve).258 But that would be a world where the FDA never lacks the 
information, personnel, technical data and other resources needed to deal 
immediately with emerging safety hazards; where the agency acts as soon as 
it identifies a problem requiring a regulatory solution; where rules are 
updated swiftly to reflect needed design changes, technological advances or 
scientific knowledge; where companies quickly and candidly inform the 
FDA about the problems they identify; and where regulatory decisions are 
made free from political considerations - without pressure from regulated 
industry, congressional committees and the White House and the Office of 
Management and Budget. That is perhaps the world that some see, but it is 
not the world observed by those who regularly work with regulatory 
agencies. 259 Nor is it the world that existed when Joshua Oukrop fell off his 
bicycle and died because his defibrillator malfunctioned. 
257. [d. (quoting Ferebee v. Chevron Chern. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1541-42 (D.C. Cir. 1984». 
258. See supra notes 12, 243 and accompanying text (discussing the recall of defective Shiley 
heart valves). 
259. For an extended discussion of this point, see David C. V1adeck, Defending Courts: A Brief 
Rejoinder to Professors Fried and Rosenberg, 31 SETON HALL L. REv. 631,640 (2002). 
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